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THE CHRISTIANITY OF CHRIST.

[Second Article.]

JESUS AND CHRIST.

As we open the Gospel, we seem to enter into the presence of Christ himself. We meet his biographers, and communicate with his disciples. We hear words from living lips, and are touched by the influence of a living soul. The biographers of Jesus place him before us under every variety of circumstance. We sympathize with the popular heart, as the form of Jesus moves from village to village in Galilee, and draws after it multitudes of people, eager to hear his word, and excited with a newly awakened hope of national deliverance. In the crowded streets of Jerusalem we watch the same figure, now lost among the throng of disciples and foes, now alone in some private porch, or garden, or chamber, with a single adversary or friend; we behold him confronting the priests, answering the questions of Scribe and Sadducee, or hurling his massy invective at the Pharisee's head. In the country districts we mingle with the simple folk that collect on the hill-side, or line the lake shore, and listen to words natural and simple as air or light; in the metropolis we join the little knot of the curious and learned, who have stayed the steps of the great Teacher, and are drawing from his lips a nobler wisdom than their schools could teach. In all these positions Christ appears perfectly like himself, probably because in them all our natural sympathies are with him, and our feelings are carried along with the movement and purpose of his life.

But we must remember that this wonderful history is not the production of a single hand, or of an individual mind. There are

four gospels, and as we peruse them carelessly, we can not but see that in many respects they are unlike one another. According to the first three historians, Jesus confines his ministry to Galilee, journeying hither and thither in the neighborhood of the Galilean sea, and throughout the region lying west of the upper Jordan, just skirting Samaria, and never entering Judea, save for baptism and for crucifixion. According to the fourth Evangelist, the public teaching of Jesus is almost confined to Judea; an indefinite number of feasts summon him continually to Jerusalem; his visits to Galilee are brief, infrequent, uneventful, and are made apparently for retirement rather than for service. The several narrators put different interpretations upon the same incident and language; they insert or omit sayings and doings of an important character; they give different impressions of Christ's mind and spirit. At first these diversities are interesting, as showing how the same person may be regarded in several aspects. We are satisfied and pleased with thinking that each biographer selected from copious materials such incidents and discourses as others had not brought forward, perhaps had not been acquainted with, or such as had left the deepest mark upon his own mind. We know how a remarkable person is variously estimated by several different unlike minds, all equally clear and honest. The same head wears a different look and expression as conceived and drawn by several artists. With even more diversity is a great soul portrayed by historians, according to their mental structure, their natural insight, or their accidental education. Socrates is a well known example of this kind, being presented in almost opposite lights in the writings of Xenophon and Plato; and in forming our estimate of that illustrious philosopher, we commonly have recourse to the matter of fact biographer, and to the ideal sage. Perhaps Matthew could not see into Christ so far as John could, being less in sympathy with his finer nature, and less able to appreciate his diviner qualities; and John, we may suppose, was uninterested in the bare incidents and the simple traits that had a charm for Luke. The superficial reader of the Evangelists, therefore, delights in the diversities which mark the Gospels. Instead of confusing, they rather amplify and enrich his conception of Jesus. They are evidences of honest and independent testimony, free from art and collusion, tending in no degree to shatter the historical form of the master, and having a marvelous effect as unfolding his spiritual personality.

But as we read the Gospels more attentively this pleasing impression is effaced. The disagreements that appeared at first so slight and evanescent, are found to be grave and permanent. Differences become discrepancies; variations become inconsistencies and even contradictions. What we took to be but reflected images of one and the same person, prove to be in reality separate persons. The portraitures are not portraitures of one individual. The elements of which our historic Christ was composed fall asunder; the members refuse to unite in the same form. We discover that Jesus has been a subject for speculation as well as an object of history, an idea as well as a fact; and we are compelled to choose between the man who lived and breathed in Judea, and the Savior who had only an ideal, speculative being in the realm of imagination.

The wide dissimilarity between the first Gospel and the fourth has always been acknowledged. In very early times it was the custom loosely to describe the former as the historical, the latter as the spiritual gospel, hereby vaguely indicating the general characteristic of each. More suggestive of their difference is the fact that they who wish to prove the divinity of Christ quote passages from John, while they who would establish his humanity refer exclusively to Matthew. Again, we know that moralists and reformers, the men of natural piety and active beneficence, simple worshippers of the Heavenly Father, and practical believers in human brotherhood, delight in the first gospel, and ask no more. The mystic, on the other hand, and the religious sentimentalist, the lover of an impersonal excellence, the sublimated saint and devotee, cleaves to the fourth Gospel as the only living word. More significant still is the plain affirmation of orthodox theologians, that John presents to us Christ as God, while Matthew presents to us Christ as man. It is true, that the gulf thus opened between the Gospels is forthwith closed by the doctrine that Christ was both God and man; and therefore the writings are in strict accord, and merely complete each other. But for those who can not accept this doctrine the gulf remains broad and fixed as ever.

Facts like these plainly indicate that the unlikeness of the Gospels has been generally recognized. But it is only when we study these books more profoundly in connection with contemporaneous literature and thought, that their differences are fully appreciated, and their place in the history of opinions definitely assigned. Such

writings, we begin to see, are not to be judged as if they stood alone, strange and miraculous productions amid the rubbish of uninspired documents. They must submit like any other compositions to the laws of historical criticism. Let us, then, examine a little closer these seeming biographies, and show by a sharper analysis their relation to each other. For the sake of convenience and clearness, we shall contrast the first Gospel, which fairly represents the synoptics, with the fourth, which stands by itself.

According to the Gospel of Matthew, Christ is a man, a mere man; an inspired man, especially endowed by the Holy Spirit with power, wisdom and righteousness, but still a man; not an angel, not a heavenly being of any rank whatever, but strictly and in all respects human. This is the prevailing and the only doctrine. A single passage is inconsistent with it—that which gives an account of the immaculate conception; but this is of little weight, as it was doubtless an addition to the earliest narratives of the life of Jesus; it is, moreover, incompatible with the genealogies which directly assert his natural origin, and with the record of his baptism, which affirms that the Holy Spirit was not imparted to Christ until he was thirty years of age. With this single and unimportant exception, Jesus is represented as a human being. He is named "Jesus," and among his neighbors and townsmen passes for the son of Joseph and Mary. His titles,—*"Son of David," "Son of man,"*—denote the human Messiah of the Jews. He is called a Prophet, which means a divinely commissioned Teacher. His childhood is passed quietly at home with his parents, to whom he was subject like any other child. He increases in wisdom and in stature; he grows in favor with God and men; he is consecrated to his work by John's baptism; he is tempted in the wilderness, and throughout life is submitted to natural necessities; he comes "eating and drinking;" he has perplexities of mind, sadness of heart, sinking of spirit; he goes into the deserts to meditate and pray. He is full of tender natural emotion, has misgivings and fears which are genuine though transient; he clings often like a woman to his friends and disciples, and gains the victory over himself by terrific struggles of soul. Contemplate that scene of anguish in Gethsemane: is it not a mortal man who suffers there? That sorrowful and heavy heart; that soul "exceeding sorrowful, even unto death;" that trembling form, bowing the face to the

dust in an agony of supplication ; that lonely spirit, fleeing from man to God, from God back again to man, seeking the refuge of human sympathy in its hour of deepest distress, and only when that is refused finding repose on the Father's breast ; the touching complaint, " Could ye not watch with me one hour ? " the heart-rending cry, " O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me ; " the second return to the slumbering disciples, and the final imploring prayer offered in trust, and answered with peace : can anything be more completely human than these ? In the absence of any indications of a higher nature, such marks are decisive, and were such indications given, they would be neutralized by these human traits.

Open we now the fourth Gospel : what an entire change do we behold ! Instead of the humble Nazarene, the Carpenter's Son, with his heart full of natural tenderness, and his soul full of natural piety, we are introduced in the very first sentence to the divine Logos, the personified Reason of God, the highest of all heavenly beings—angel of the archangels—with no humanity whatever, with no human intellect, or heart, or soul ; simply the conscious intelligence of the Infinite. This Logos, we read, was in the beginning with God, and was divine ; all things were made by Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made. In Him was life, and the life was the light of men ; He was ever in the world, but the darkened world knew Him not. He came unto His own, and His own received Him not. Only a few received Him, and to them He imparted the new birth.

In the course of time the divine Logos assumed a human form, and becomes a visible apparition upon the earth. This incarnate Deity is Christ, who walks among men clothed with godlike attributes, the " only begotten Son," full of grace and truth,—who came from heaven—who is in heaven. He has life in Himself, and is the giver of eternal life to all who believe in Him.

Everything in the Gospel accords with this view of Christ's angelic nature. There is no immaculate birth ; for the Supreme and preëxistent Logos needs not to be born at all, even of one parent. No element of mortality is allowed to enter into his composition. He incarnates himself and becomes manifest.

There is no infancy, no childhood, no submission to father and mother, no growth in wisdom and goodness, no increase in favor with God and men. The divine Logos comes into the world fully

developed, replete already with celestial gifts, perfect in supernatural knowledge, refulgent in celestial glory.

There is no Baptism: and why? Because the divine Logos, seeing that from the very beginning he was the appointed author of all inspiration to mankind, being himself the fulness of the Holy Spirit, could not stand as a recipient of its occasional influx.

The account of the Temptation is omitted, of course. The divine Logos, before whose face evil flies like shadows before the sun, could not be tempted. Temptation implies a struggle with unholy powers—a struggle which in this case would be not so much impossible as inconceivable.

There is no Gethsemane in the fourth Gospel; that scene of agony is passed over altogether. A faint reminiscence of it seems to lurk in chap. xii. verse 27, "Now is my soul troubled, and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour; but for this cause came I unto this hour;" but these words do not break from the heart like the exclamation in Matthew. The divine Logos could not suffer like the mortal Christ; could not, even for an instant, be subject to anguish and fear. Throughout the Gospel the Savior is described as exempt from physical and mental weakness. His virtues are superhuman; his affections are impersonal. Great stress is commonly laid upon the declaration that "Jesus wept" at the grave of Lazarus. But are those genuine human tears, which are shed over a friend whom one is certain of restoring to life? Would he who did not grieve when the disconsolate Mary flung herself at his feet, feel touched with natural sorrow for her brother at the moment he was about to raise him from the dead? The whole narrative of the resurrection of Lazarus would be thought artificial, if we met with it in any ordinary book. But, granting the rest to be as natural as it is claimed to be, Christ's trouble of soul is wholly unaccountable, seeing that he deliberately allows his friend to die, in order that he may exhibit the glory of God by calling him from the grave, and meets Martha with the positive assurance that he shall rise again.

Even on the cross the voice that says, "I thirst,"—"It is finished,"—has no human feeling in it. Indeed, there is no better illustration of the difference between John's Gospel and the rest, than is furnished by their several accounts of the crucifixion. According to Matthew, Jesus, faint from watching and pallid with grief, is arrested in the garden, whither he had gone with his dis-

ciples to pray. He is seized by stealth, and hurried before Caiaphas, who sat in council with the elders and scribes. To the accusation brought against him he makes no reply; the insults he endures in silence. Brought before Pilate, he maintains the same reserve, making no answer to the inquiries put to him, whereat the governor marvels greatly. Patiently he bears the soldiers' mockery and cruel smiting; worn with sleeplessness and suffering, he staggers under the cross, the burden of which is laid upon another; he speaks tender and piteous words to the pious women who lament as he passes; the executioners nail him to the cross, and as the spikes of iron are driven by the hammer into his flesh he murmurs, "Father, forgive them; they know not what they do." He is lifted up between the two thieves, amid the ribaldry of the rulers and the jests of the people. We can almost feel the pangs of his sensitive frame. Then comes from him that piteous human cry, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me!" And after an interval of silent struggle, during which some of those present endeavor to force the moistened sponge between his lips, the last exclamation breaks forth, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit,"—and all is over.

Compare, now, this spectacle of mortal torture with the parallel scene in John. Instead of the short, sharp ejaculations in the solitude of the garden, uttered a stone's throw from the sleeping disciples, we have the long, calm, elaborate prayer of intercession delivered before his followers, in some place unknown, as recorded in chap. xvii.; immediately after which Christ passes over the brook Kedron, into the garden, and in a perfectly composed and even stately manner, as if by concerted arrangement, surrenders himself to the armed band of stout Roman soldiers, who, overawed by his presence, start back and fall to the ground. With lofty impenetrability he confronts Annas and Caiaphas. In the judgment hall of Pilate he stands unmoved, but not now is he speechless; for to the ruler's questions he makes calm and full reply in the same tone of grandeur that he ever assumed. He exhibits no sign of quailing or of weakness; his air towards the governor is even defiant; no sinking or falling is there beneath the weight of his cross, nor does any utterance of pain escape from those nerveless lips. With utmost calmness while suspended on the cross he commends his mother to the care of the beloved disciples; then, "knowing that all things were now accomplished, that the Scripture might

be fulfilled," says, "I thirst." The vinegar is put to his mouth; he receives it, as if to do so were a part of the dismal drama; speaks the words, "It is finished," and gives up the ghost. This is passing away, not dying. It is the withdrawal of a disembodied spirit, not the crucifixion of a mortal frame. It is the vanishing of a God, not the violent death of a man.

But for this painless departure we have been prepared by the preceding chapters of the Gospel; for throughout the book we are forced to see that Jesus has, properly, no mortal body. In Matthew and Luke he is a creature of flesh and blood; in John he only seems to be so. He is an apparition, not a man. He makes himself invisible at his pleasure. He disappears mysteriously, and is not to be found. In chap. viii. 59, we are told that the people took up stones to cast at him, "but Jesus hid himself, and went out of the temple, going through the midst of them, and so passed by,"—or, more exactly rendered, "made himself secret and went out of the temple." How is this to be explained? Jesus could not have hidden himself in the midst of a crowd thirsting for his blood; he could not have passed visibly through their mass unnoticed or unharmed. But he was concealed, and he did pass through the throng. He must, then, have made himself invisible. And this is just what the text tells us he did, when it says that he "made himself secret." Similar hidings are mentioned in chap. x. 39, and chap. xii. 36. But a more remarkable instance than either of these occurs in chap. vii. 10, seq. The brethren of Jesus urge him to go up to Jerusalem on occasion of the feast of tabernacles. He replies to them, "My time is not yet come, but your time is always at hand. Go ye up to the feast: I go not up yet to this feast, for my time is not come." But no sooner had his brethren departed than he followed them, "not openly, but as it were in secret." By this we are not to understand that Jesus repaired to Jerusalem in a private conveyance, or by an unfrequented way, but that he went in a guise which could not be recognized,—he went *incognito*. It is not so much in time as in manner that his journey differs from that of his brethren. They want him to go up openly, in his own person: he goes up in the semblance of another person, and remains some time in Jerusalem without being recognized either by his brethren or by the people. About the midst of the feast Jesus goes up into the temple and teaches; but the Jews, who must have known him very well from

his previous visits, and who had been expecting him eagerly on this very occasion, do not know him as he stands before their eyes, but mistake him for some stranger. "How knoweth this man letters," they say, "having never learned?" Christ, after further discourse, charges them with seeking his life. They only laugh at him, and call him crazy; they could not, therefore, have recognized him, for it was notorious that a large party in the city were anxious to apprehend Jesus, and put him to death. Could they have forgotten this? or did they suppose that the person addressing them was not the man they sought? Everything is explained, if we suppose Jesus to have assumed a strange form which concealed instead of manifested his person. In this way, too, we escape the contradiction between the words of Christ to his brethren, in verse 8, and his conduct, in verse 10.

This Docketism, which ascribes to Christ an immaterial body, that could be put off and on, or altered in appearance at will, furnishes the only plausible explanation of what ensued after the resurrection. As Mary turned away from the empty sepulchre, she sees Jesus standing close by, and fails to recognize him. He speaks to her; but still she takes him to be the gardener, and begs him to tell her where her lord was. He then calls her familiarly by name and is revealed to her. Why did Mary fail to recognize him instantly? Because she did not observe him carefully? That could not have been, for the angels had just told her that he had risen, and she might reasonably expect to see him, and would be naturally inclined to mistake another for him. Was she blinded by her tears? That is fancy.

Mary is about to throw herself at his feet—Matthew says that the disciples came and held him by the feet and worshiped him—but he prevents her, and says, "Do not touch me, for I am not yet ascended to my Father." The ascension to the place from whence he came, as Jesus had intimated before, was to precede the coming of the Holy Spirit, and was to be the condition of that coming. "The Holy Ghost was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified."—vii. 39. "It is expedient for you that I go away; for, if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but, if I depart, I will send him unto you."—xvi. 7. "When the Comforter is come, *whom I will send unto you from the Father*, even the Spirit of Truth which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me."—xv. 26. Now, on the evening of

the same day on which Mary and Jesus spoke together, when the disciples were assembled, and had shut the doors for fear of the Jews, Jesus appeared among them in his own form, pronounced the benediction of peace, breathed upon them, and communicated the Holy Ghost. He must, therefore, have ascended to the Father between this day's morning and evening; hence his unwillingness that Mary should touch him, and so delay, by so much as an instant, his return to the heavenly mansions. Since his work was not completed till the Paraclete's coming, he must send him at once.

In this narrative, Christ is at first unknown to Mary, and afterwards, by his disclosure, known. He rises to the bosom of the Father; he reappears on the earth, passes mysteriously and invisibly into a closed chamber, reveals himself to the disciples, and vanishes. Once more the phantom appears, in order to overcome the incredulity of Thomas, invested with a body that is palpable, and which must have become palpable for the sole purpose of being touched, after his entrance into the chamber; for how could such a body as Thomas handled have come into the room unperceived, through a fastened door? The corporal part of Christ is described as being quite as tangible after the crucifixion as it was before; and yet it is a body that can dwell equally on the earth and in the skies, is visible or invisible at will, can pass through solid walls as easily as light passes through air or glass. No wonder that such a being did not suffer in being crucified.

The first Gospel represents Jesus as having a body of flesh and blood, at all times, both after his resurrection and before. The third Gospel gives him a mortal frame until the time of his death, and afterwards an apparition form, which disguised him to the disciples through the course of a long walk, and only allowed his person to shine through for a moment. But the fourth Gospel is alone in allowing him none but a phantom shape from the beginning.

Let us now turn to some other contrasts. The Jesus of Matthew and Luke is a human teacher, a prophet, distinguished mainly by the purity of his doctrine, and the power of his word. He delivers moral precepts or religious truths in the picturesque style of his nation, and endeavors to instruct men by appeals to their rational and spiritual nature. The Christ of the fourth Gospel is a manifestation of divine glory and supernal wisdom. He has come a Light into the world. He does not show the way; he *is* the way.

He does not communicate truth; he *is* the truth. He does not point men to the life; he *is* the life. He stands up and shines, and the power of darkness is overcome. He is not an interpreter of the Word, but the Word itself; he therefore never argues or expounds—he only presents himself, makes his announcement, appears.

The fourth Gospel teaches that mankind are saved by Faith in the Logos. "This is the work of God, that we believe on him whom He hath sent." "If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins." "He that believeth is not condemned, but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God." "The Father himself loveth you because ye have believed that I came out from God." Such are a few passages, out of many, to the effect that men are saved by Faith.

In strong contrast with such declarations, the other Evangelists make Jesus assert emphatically, over and over again, that men are saved not by Faith, but by natural goodness. One passage of this import is as good as many: "Not every one that saith unto me 'Lord, Lord,' shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father who is in heaven. Many will say to me in that day, 'Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name, and in thy name have cast out devils, and in thy name done many wonderful works? [Observe, not believed miracles only, but wrought them.] And then I will profess unto them 'I never knew you; depart from me, ye that work iniquity.' " What language can be plainer than this? Nay, Jesus expressly declares that, though men reject him, and speak against him, they shall be forgiven.—Matt. xii. 32. According to the great Teacher, doing is ever the test of believing. "The tree is known by its fruit." "He that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, is like a man who builds his house upon a rock." "He that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them not, is like a man who builds his house on the sand." Men are saved by a good heart and a good life. Faith in the person and mission of Christ is nothing. Faith in God and the spiritual laws is all. It is a slight thing to believe that Jesus is the Messiah: it is a great thing to know that God is a Father.

In making this comparison, it is not forgotten that the Logos Redeemer of John commands his disciples to love one another.

But even in doing this he widens instead of closing the gulf between himself and the Jesus of Matthew. We read such texts as these: "Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit: so shall ye be my disciples." "Ye are my friends, if ye do whatsoever I command you." "A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another: as I have loved you, that ye also love one another; by this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one towards another." But with such passages open before us, we feel that the "Love" of the fourth Gospel is not the Beneficence of the first. It differs in its character, and it differs in its objects. It is rather a spiritual grace than a moral virtue, a transcendental state of sentiment spending itself in contemplation, rather than a lowly, practical kindness of heart spending itself in action. In one word, it is not *humane*. Nor does it embrace in its influence mankind at large, man as man, like the Mercy of Matthew's Gospel. It is confined to the brotherhood. It is ever, "love ye one another"—"wash ye one another's feet:" an injunction that refers to the disciples only, as appears from the fact that it, like all similar language, is addressed to them in private, as a community of believers, cut off from the "world," and enjoying a peculiar life by virtue of their faith in the Redeemer.

It is worth while to note, as interesting in this connection, the character assigned to Christ himself by the different Evangelists. How little does the mystic Savior of John, laying down his phantom form for his "friends," resemble the humane benefactor of Matthew, who came to seek and to save the lost! Compare their deeds. The first three Gospels are full of merciful works. Jesus ministers daily to the infirmities and griefs of men. He pities their weaknesses, cures their diseases, forgives their sins. Lepers feel his kindness; the lame, the blind, the dumb are brought to him. He heals the lunatic and the possessed. The pity of Jesus is as natural as his breath. He is brother and sister and mother to all earth's afflicted ones. Mark now the contrast. In the whole fourth Gospel, Christ heals but one sick man, cures but one blind man, and raises one from the dead. Of one class of marvelous cures most common in Matthew and Luke—namely, the casting out of demons—not a single example occurs in the book.

According to Matthew, Jesus uses his miraculous powers for e benefit of his fellow men, seeking not his own glory, but their

welfare. According to John, the Logos works wonders for the explicit purpose of manifesting himself, apparently indifferent to the suffering he alleviates. The miracles are "signs," serving to show forth or illustrate the divine Christ to the world. At the wedding feast in Cana, Jesus declines, at first, to provide more wine, "because his hour was not yet come." The object of the miracle was, therefore, not to give pleasure to the guests, but to announce himself. When the ruler of Capernaum implores him to come and heal his son, who lay at the point of death, his thoughts, instead of dwelling upon the father's misery, revert at once to his own position. He welcomes an opportunity of displaying his heaven-born gifts, at the same time that he is impatient with the bystanders for demanding such evidence of his character. "Unless ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe." That they may believe is, then, we infer, the end of the miracle; the cure of the nobleman's dying son is incidental. As Christ was passing through the streets of Jerusalem with his disciples, they met a man who had been blind from his birth. His disciples asked him for whose sin, his own or his parents', this person had been afflicted with blindness. "For no one's sin," answered the Master; "he was born blind that the works of God should be made manifest in him;" as if to say he was born blind in order that Jesus might exhibit himself as the Light of the world. He then opened the man's eyes, evidently less anxious that the lost vision should be restored, than that the eyes of others should be opened to behold himself. When Jesus hears of the sickness of his friend Lazarus, he remarks at once, "This sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of God, that the Son of God might be glorified thereby;" explicitly asserting that Lazarus is made sick for the sake of offering to the life-giving Redeemer an occasion for exhibiting his divine attributes. Nay, that the display may be more satisfactory, he waits three days before going to Bethany; waits for Lazarus to die, in order that his own glory may be manifested in full lustre in raising his friend from the dead. These wonderful works of mercy are not wrought for the purpose of blessing mankind, but for the purpose of displaying the Logos. The alleviation of human misery is incidental to the manifestation of his personal dignity.

Nor is this all: each more conspicuous miracle is followed by a long speech, in which Christ expatiates upon his character and mis-

sion, vindicates himself against defamers, and rebukes those who refuse to believe on him. Thus the healing of the impotent man at the pool of Bethesda introduces some high discourse upon the relations of Christ to the Father, and his offices as quickener and judge. The miraculous multiplication of the loaves, set forth with so much circumstance at the opening of chap. vi., is the theme of the whole chapter, throughout which Christ speaks of himself as "the Bread of Life"—"the bread that came down from heaven, that men might eat thereof and not die"—the bread, of which if any man eat, he shall live forever—"As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father, so he that eateth me shall live by me." The entire significance of the miracle is exhausted upon the person of Christ himself—the lesson being that men must desire the Bread which cometh from heaven, that by receiving him in faith they may obtain eternal life.

The treatment of the woman taken in adultery (chap. viii.), the only touching act of humanity recorded of Christ in the Gospel, seems to be inserted merely as an occasion for the bitter controversy which is continued to the close of the chapter, in which Christ vindicates himself against the unbelieving Jews. The ninth chapter is wholly devoted to the story of the man born blind, the public investigation of whose case brings out in strong relief the obstinacy of the Jewish unbelief. The point of the chapter is expressed in verse 39: "For judgment I am come into this world, that they which see not might see, and they which see might be made blind." The blind man believes and worships; the self-conceited Pharisees are declared blind, and condemned. The miracle is this declaration expressed in symbolical act; the declaration is the miracle in its spiritual significance. The glory of Christ is the end of both. Each of these miracles is a new manifestation of the greatness and majesty of the Redeemer, wrought for the purpose of setting forth his divinity and drawing people towards him. How entirely unlike the unostentatious Jesus of Matthew and Luke!

Once more: the Jesus of Matthew appeals to the moral nature of man; throws him back upon himself; endeavors to arouse him to a sense of his spiritual capacities, and make him strong in holy self-reliance. He tells the poorest and the feeblest to perform the divine commandment, never doubting that they can perform it if they will. Men are to judge for themselves what is right, and to do the best they know. A young ruler, rich and noble, comes to

inquire the way to the eternal life. "Keep the commandments," says Jesus. "I have always kept them," replies the young man. "Then do something harder: sell your goods, and distribute the money to the poor." And when the exemplary youth sadly turns away, Jesus looks after him, and says, "It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven." But he offers to him no vicarious aid; he does not tell him that if he will but believe he shall be saved; he has no sovereign specific to recommend in the place of hardly-won excellence. He bids men trust in themselves for virtue, not in him.

But hear what the Logos of John says: "Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch can not bear fruit except it abide in the vine, no more can ye except ye abide in me." "Without me ye can do nothing." "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you." "In the world ye shall have tribulation: but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world." Is this the same person who elsewhere bids men conquer the world by the force of their own endeavor?

The difference between the fourth Gospel and the first, in what they teach respecting the person of Jesus, is strikingly exhibited by their totally dissimilar doctrines respecting prayer. Perhaps no single point shows their radical disagreement more forcibly than this; for prayer mediates between the human and the divine. None but mortals pray; none but deities are addressed with prayer. It is characteristic of the man Jesus of Matthew, that, like any other mortal, he prays for *himself*. Alone, or with his disciples, in the chamber of mourning, or in the desert solitude, he is perpetually lifting up his eyes in supplication. He retires into the mountains to pray apart. He spends whole nights in supplication. He prays naturally and earnestly, as one who felt his need of strength from above. He was praying in the Jordan when the Spirit descended upon him; he was praying on the Mount of Transfiguration when the glory overshadowed him. He prayed in Gethsemane with a heart almost rent with holy passion, until the drops of agony rolled down his face. Passages alluding to Jesus as praying for himself are sprinkled all over the synoptical Gospels.

It is a peculiarity of the fourth Gospel, and is characteristic of its view of Christ as the Logos, that in the whole book no one instance of the Savior's praying for himself occurs—not one from the beginning to the end.

The Logos of John is an Intercessor. When he prays he prays for others. At the grave of Lazarus he offers a prayer; not, however, for himself, but "because of the people that stood by, that they might know that the Father had sent him." The seventeenth chapter is one long prayer of intercession for the disciples who are with him, and for those who in future shall become disciples through their word; for the actual and possible members of the Church. Single passages might be quoted almost without end. In Matthew we find none—not a single one of similar purport. The divine Logos may intercede, the human Jesus never.

Again, according to Matthew, men are directed to pray in their own name, meeting the Heavenly Father face to face: "After this manner pray ye, 'Our Father who art in heaven.'" "Watch and pray, lest ye enter into temptation." "Whatsoever ye ask in prayer, believing, ye shall receive." "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you; for every one that asketh, receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened." "If ye, then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father in heaven give good things to them that ask Him." On the other hand, according to John, men are directed to pray in the name of Christ, without whose mediation prayer does not avail. "Whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son. If ye shall ask any thing in my name, I will do it." "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you." "In that day [after his ascension to the Father] ye shall ask me nothing;" implying that when on earth he was himself the object of prayer: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my name, he will give it you." "Hitherto have ye asked nothing in my name" (because the disciples had prayed to him and not to the Father directly). "At that day ye shall ask in my name, and I say not that I will pray the Father *for* you, for the Father himself loveth you, because ye have loved me, and have believed that I came out from God." More positive declarations than these, declarations more positively affirming a difference of nature in the Jesus of Matthew, and the Christ of John, it would be impossible to frame. And when we consider that each Gospel is characterized by its own view, neither containing aught of the other's doctrine, while both are consistent

with their own, it is certainly difficult to escape the conviction that we have here delineated two entirely distinct personages, one of whom is a suppliant, the other a hearer of supplication; one of whom might be the disciple of the other, saved through faith in him, worshipping him, drawing nigh to God by his intercession, related to him as one of the redeemed to the Redeemer.

Something has already been said in illustration of the difference between the great Teacher of Matthew's Gospel, and the divine Oracle of John's. A word or two more upon this point may not be amiss. Let the reader peruse carefully, and in connection, chapters v., vi., vii., of Matthew, and chapters v., vi., vii., of John. Let him study any individual discourse of Jesus as recorded by John, and he will acknowledge the impossibility that the same person should have pronounced it who spoke any of the words put by the first Evangelist into the mouth of Christ. The Jesus of Matthew utters parables,—brief picturesque fables, suggested by some local circumstance or passing event, unstudied, fresh, full of natural beauty and rich with homely wisdom, at the same time appealing to the imagination and touching the heart. The Logos of John delivers long and stately disquisitions, barren of fancy, devoid of feeling, empty of allusion to the world without, and to surrounding events, purely dialectical in motive, arrangement and purpose, wanting in adaptation to time, place and people, addressed as it were to an imaginary audience, uttered like oracles to the air, or spoken to an impersonal reason as calm and unfeeling as the atmosphere itself.

The Jesus of Matthew teaches in a perfectly unostentatious way the principles of natural piety and practical goodness. He speaks to the men about him, gives them rules for right conduct, and shows their application to life's every-day concerns. He inculcates personal excellence, deals with vice and sin sharply and without reserve, praises virtue wherever he sees it. He urges the doctrine of Brotherhood, enunciates the law of common kindness and humanity, declares that the kingdom of Heaven is a kingdom to be established on earth, through Love. He treats the current questions of the day, never argues without an immediate practical purpose, never discourses except to convict the conscience or kindle the soul. He is a living preacher, and a living reformer in the best sense, never allowing himself to be lost in the mazes of metaphysics or enervated by dreams of Truth. The Logos of John, in strong contrast

to this, rarely announces a moral law, or applies a moral principle. With practical piety and virtue he has little or nothing to do. The topics of the time do not concern him; the problems of the religious and social life of his generation have no interest for him. He discourses upon his own nature and mission, his descent from above, his intimacy with the Father, the power of his word, the sufficiency of his life, the dependence of all men upon himself, the efficacy of faith in him, the necessity and significance of his death, and the mystical union which he has effected between the believer and God. He speaks as to those who should come after him, for the wisest of his contemporaries must have failed to apprehend the point of his allusions, the meaning of his dark sayings, or the drift of those vague prophesyings, which no Jew could have unraveled. His strain is theological. When he reasons, which is not often, his reasoning is abstruse. He controverts perpetually—in fact, he does little else; and always by overwhelming asseveration. It is impossible to believe that Jesus of Nazareth talked in a style of such grand abstractions; the very language of which abounds in the phraseology of the schools, the technical terms of the Asiatic sects, the phrases of an Alexandrian mystic or a disciple of Philo. Ever and anon, the peculiar formulas of the Eastern Sages drop from his lips aptly and consciously, and with such neatness of statement that no philosopher could surpass it. Dissimilarity like this is not accidental: it is substantial. It runs through the manner, matter and mind of the Teacher. It is caused by no mere change of place or of audience. Jesus of Nazareth could not have uttered in Jerusalem, or any where else, the discourse reported in the sixth chapter of John. The Logos could under no imaginable circumstances have delivered the sermon on the Mount.

An exhaustive comparison of the first three Gospels with the fourth would reveal other points of dissimilarity as marked perhaps as any of those that have been mentioned. But these are sufficient for the present purpose. And upon the strength of these must it not be granted that we have in these writings two distinct Christs, two distinct persons, standing each apart in his own individuality? Matthew declares, both explicitly and by implication, that Jesus of Nazareth is strictly human; all he makes him say, and all he makes him do, is in exact accordance with that supposition. John declares, both explicitly and by implication, that Jesus, not of Nazareth, is the divine Logos, and all he makes

him say and do is in closest accord with this theory. Which now of these is the true and living historical Christ? Both can not be: we must decide for one or the other. If Jesus were the incarnate Reason of God, he could not have been a simple man. If he were a simple man, he could not have been the incarnate Reason of God. If his soul were human, it could not have been angelic. And if the Logos supplied the place of a soul, we can not say that his soul was that of a man. One only of these delineations of Christ is historically true. Whichever it be, the other is a fancy picture, portraying an ideal person, and not a real one. If John's Christ be authentic, Matthew's is imaginary. If Matthew's be authentic, John's is imaginary. We are not to try to confound them together, or to blend them in one. That has been attempted long and persistently, and without success. We must take the representations as they are, make them as sharp in outline as possible, and then decide which we will accept; or rather, which we *must* accept, for we are not at liberty to choose the one we may chance to prefer. There are rules of criticism established and binding, rules which are disobeyed and annulled whenever private taste is substituted for the decree of history.

THE WORD.

[Second Paper.]

WE are now ready to consider the bearings of our theory upon the well-attested fact of which the etymologists have given us accumulations of evidence, viz.: the poetical and symbolical character of words in ordinary use. The industrious researches of our word-analysts have culminated in the affirmation, that words are the symbols of things, *but only symbols*. Apart from their correspondent facts and realities, they are as the contemptible chatter of the raven. The word *love* can not do instead of loving; *truth* and *mercy* can mean nothing, save to the merciful and true. What are our letters, indeed, in the largest sense, but the show of things? A book about gardening, or metaphysics, or what not, is merely finger-post to the fact, not the fact itself. You can not get an electric shock from a treatise by Dr. Carpenter. The best library is to real thought and life only what the index is to the book. What men have thought, felt or perceived, they have ex-

pressed in gesture and articulation ; thinking, feeling, and perceiving the same or corresponding things, in all time, men become parties to the words which express them. The circulating medium of words, then, strictly accords with that of money, in that neither have other than a representative value ; as one can not eat and wear gold, nor inhale the word *atmosphere*, but only what these stand for. Speech thus becomes Nature translated. Not only is this so in names, where persons are named from personal peculiarities or occupations, or where *hawk* is *havoc*, *raven* is *ravenous*, *owl* is *howl*, but the higher words which mark the abysses fathomed, or heights scaled by man, as a spiritual being, bear upon them this bloom of nature. The word *right* is simply *straight*, and reveals man's interpretation of the directness and simplicity of nature. The tree growing, or the stone let fall, go straight—i. e., right ; all things tend to go straight, unless disturbed or *wrung* from that course—hence *wrong*, which is simply *wrung*. The French have the same word for wrong, *tort*, twisted. The word brings before us, almost visibly, some simple and earnest prophet of the early dawn, rebuking some wrong-doer, by twisting and beating down some young sapling, showing by an image which afterward became a word, *whoso sinneth wrongeth his own soul*. So also the word *transgression*, or *crossing a line*, carries us back to the time when boys became for the first time fully sensible of the value of orchards, by seeing a line or furrow marked around them, indicating possession. This line being frequently transgressed, swells in course of time into a fence, or, worse, a wall with ugly spikes on top ; and as these fruits were descendants of the original forbidden fruit, and these boys descendants of Eve, the perpetually recurring tragedy of the first garden formed the sad word *transgression*, primarily, jumping over your neighbor's fence. Mr. Walker, and those who are casting fond glances at Cuba, will please take notice !

But far beyond the maxims even of morality, up into the realm which "eye hath not seen nor ear heard," this faithful earth-woven vesture becomes man's snow-white raiment of transfiguration. "Man is one world, and hath another to attend him," said Herbert ; it may be added, that the attendant never leaves him, even in the presence of his God. His *Heaven* is simply *heaven*, a figure drawn from the up-heaven appearance of the sky ; *holiness* is *wholeness*, soundness (from verb *to heal*) ; *purity* is something refined by fire, (Gk. *πῦρ*). One of the most striking forms of

symbolical expression is embodied in the word *spirit*, literally the *breath* or the *wind*. When man first hears the voice of the majestic soul, it is written, "They heard the voice of the Lord God walking in the garden, in the wind." Anaximenes taught that the air was the Deity; and that the symbol had passed into the popular speech is evident from the fact that Horace, poet of the people, speaks of the huntsman's remaining out *sub frigido Jove*,—literally "under the cold Jupiter,"—meaning under the cold air. And what symbol of that Power which sweeps past us in human life, in war and peace, in all history, forever moulding that which is to that which is to be, is truer than the atmosphere embosoming all, sustaining all,

The All-upholder,
The All-enfolder;

the fluid wind, invisible but bending, overwhelming the visible; now tenderly fanning the fevered brow, now holding in his hand the uplifted ocean or desert as bolts wherewith he would smite the earth in wrath! He who spake as never man spake went back to the very fountain of the word, and its meaning in all languages, when he said, "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, or whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the *spirit*."

Now, the bearing of our theory on these facts is, that, if this is found to be the law operative in the word-formations of the later and more complex states of society, the same principle may be supposed to have always operated; and that principle by which the perception of one sense slides in to define that of another (since "born of the spirit (*wind*)" fuses the senses as much as Wordsworth's "eye-music") could only and legitimately appear in the rudiments of language as the translation into sound, and oftener into form, of all impressions made on all the senses.

The historian Herodotus (ii. 2) relates that Psammithichus, desirous of settling the question of priority between the Egyptians and Phrygians, contrived as follows: He entrusted two infants to a shepherd to be brought up with his flock, commanding that no word of any kind, or sound of human voice, should be uttered in their hearing, but that they should stay by themselves in a solitary hut, and that goats should be brought to them at certain times to feed them with milk. The object of this was to know what word they would utter first, whether Phrygian or Egyptian. After two

years of this treatment, at the entrance of the shepherd on one occasion, both boys, fondling at his feet, and stretching out their arms, cried, *Bekos! bekos!* It was found that this word meant *bread* among the ancient Phrygians. "Since then the Egyptians allowed that the Phrygians were anterior to themselves." The Greeks add to this fanciful story—which Herodotus went all the way from Memphis to Heliopolis to investigate—that Psammitichus had the infants fed on women's tongues, villainously insinuating that such diet would hasten the faculty of speech; which shows that few in his own age looked upon the story in the grave light of our historian. We have quoted it here only as a text for speculation as to the normal development of speech under such conditions, if we could imagine them. *One* child, reared in this utter solitude and silence, would, of course, never speak so long as such conditions were continued. Two or more, it might be supposed, would form a kind of noisy animal communication; but they could never form a word for anything until it had been presented. Ideas must invariably precede words. This has been sufficiently illustrated in the case of the Hebrew alphabet—which is essentially one with the Syriac, Arabic, Ethiopic, and other alphabets of the East, with the Greek, and with our own, the Roman—in which all the vocal and pictorial elements of language range only from the fish caught to the pan in which it is cooked, objects to which, by the severe necessities of nature, man's deepest interests, and consequently his conversation, are limited. Hunger, with these solitary children who had heard no utterance, would bring out gestures and noises at first, and afterward it is quite probable that a fine ear might detect an indication of the root of the word for eating used by the race to which the children belonged. Of course, any combination of objects and ideas as that involved in the word *bread*, would need knowledge to utter it, as it required civilization to make it. Each object or idea, simple or complex, unlocks, when it comes, a new perception in the mind; this perception immediately reports its birth to the ear and eye, which form a committee, with the throat, lips and lungs, to supply it with a body of sound, and clothe it in a word.

It may be said, in passing, that this story of the king and the children, quite idle as history, is, like other myths, not without its grain of truth and suggestion. The best training in philology would be to observe closely the earliest articulation of a child, and

the gradual formation of its words. As in the embryo the animal passes through all the shapes which preceded its appearance on earth—the crab being at one time trilobite, at another lobster, ere it is born crab—so, observing a child's first efforts at speech, we find marked resemblances to the idioms of many ancient tongues; and with their growth we can discover many hints as to the methods by which primitive natural sounds and idioms were polished or travestied into more convenient equivalents. Here, also, the child is father of the man.

William v. Humboldt has said, "Language is the striving of the power of speech to break forth according to the mental cast of a people." * As we can only estimate men aright when we regard each as having a personal reason for distinct existence, as having in his individuality a *forte*, a citadel of strength in his heart, with reference to the maintenance of which every atom and fibre of his being was prepared, and by which alone he can help the world, thus hearing a celestial chorus arising from the very diversity of men, so must we estimate races. Each race has its peculiar strength. Nothing can be more definite than our impressions of the Oriental mind on the Greek mind, the German, Anglo-Saxon or French characteristics. Each is as distinct from the other as one man is from another: each in some direction superior to the others. Mr. Emerson, in his lecture on the French, shrewdly compares the world to the camel with its many stomachs, in which, as it is said, lies its great strength; in our earthly Behemoth every race is a stomach, and man can only reach his full strength and culture by passing through them all. Man must have Greece in his intellect, the Orient in his imagination, Germany in his intuitions, France in his understanding, and Palestine in his heart. He can not be the true Geologist who observes the formations in the Jura and neglects those of Nahant. And because it is, as Humboldt has said, in its language that the mental cast of a people breaks forth, we must regard the study of a nation's language as a perception of the universal truth and beauty through an added lens. In this sense, it was a worthy saying of old Roger Ascham, tutor of Queen Elizabeth: "Even as a hawk fleeth not hie with one wing, even so a man reacheth not to excellency with one tongue;"

* Ueber die Kawi Sprache, s. xxv.

and the saying of Charles V. is even better: *Autant de langues que l'homme sait parler, autant de fois il est homme.*

The student of Man, then, must look upon it as a very ungracious and useless task to argue the unity of origin of the races of men, which nowhere finds less support than in the letter and spirit of their languages. It has already been asserted that we meet with instances where two races have found some one aspect of an object so prominent that both have represented it in their word, as where the Indians gave a river the Greek name *Potomac*; but the infinite number of instances where there is no identity in languages would make any conclusion from these occasional resemblances very like that of the one jurymen who hung the jury, and declared that they were eleven of the most obstinate men he had ever met! Far gladlier can we have faith that in each race we have what its mother-land can contribute to the general sum of Human Intelligence and Strength; that in the mystic Pantheism of the Orient, which is never hurtful unless congealed under cold north-western skies into a dogma, we have what the out-spreading Banyan, the Palm, with its many uses, the flush and glory of Nature to the verge of conscious feeling, would unite to express; that in the hardy and untameable nature of the American Indian we have the report made of themselves to an advancing civilization by rock-bridges and cataracts, interminable rivers, limitless prairies; that in Christianity we have what the severe hardships of a great people, their wanderings, captivities, toils, sorrows, through long ages, distilled as living water, perennial and divine. When we see a beautiful flower, as the honeysuckle, with its long horn of plenty, does it not need and imply that animated sapphire, the humming-bird, with its long beak exactly fitted to the cornucopia? Is it not a crowning beauty that its sweetness is not wasted, but ascends? Throughout nature the same eternal fitness prevails. So does each race of men come to the dreary chaos of its land; and through its brain, out at its eye, streams that Spirit of God, which, moving upon all, changes all to order. For, as the counterpart of ignorance within is Chaos without, the counterpart of intelligence is Kosmos.

Reason would seem to find a sufficient explanation of all separate national histories, a reason for tyrannies, oppressions, revolutions and religions, in the development of each race through all appropriate strata to self-realization. Must not man creep and

fly ere he becomes the anthropos, or being of the uplifted eye? Nay, must not each individual repeat the progress of his species? Each race must have of experience just what will quarry, hew, and polish that stone which it is appointed to bring to the ever-rising temple where not men, but man, shall meet God face to face. We have intimated that this history of a race is preserved in its words. We will pause here for a moment in order to emphasize the distinction and superiority of the word over the literature of a people for this special and scientific purpose. The chief superiority of the word is, that it never lies. It may, indeed, state a thing not scientifically correct, as do the words *lunatic*, *sunrise*, etc.; but it perfectly and honestly reports what is at the time of its birth the truth, *i. e.*, what men *throw* or believe. And whilst men are continually surrendering their tongues to cant, and allowing their pens and pulpits to accumulate a literature of Hypocrisy, Truth stands secure upon the Word, and cries, "By your words ye shall be justified, and by your words ye shall be condemned." Mr. Trench catches a glimpse of the tremendous import of this fact—as derived from the admitted fact that words are as representative as fossils—and somewhat frightened for the result, hastily covers up the scholar's gown with the curate's sleeves and surplice, and proceeds to make a plea of Word *vs.* Human Nature. We are sorry to have to say that Mr. Trench, in his theological chapter, descends far beneath the dignity of his subject, and is guilty of dishonesty. He quotes certain expressions, as found in various languages, signifying pleasure felt by men at the calamities of others, as evidence of the inherent baseness of the human heart. He cites the Greek *ἐπιχαίρεκακία*—German, *schadenfreude*—and remarks that "Cicero so strongly feels that such a word is wanting, that he gives to *malevolentia* the same significance, '*voluptas ex malo alterius*,' though it lies not of necessity in the word." Now, it might have been stated by Mr. Trench that the words he quotes to sustain him were not words in any just sense; that they were the conceptions of individual authors, which never were adopted even into academical conversation, much less that of the people. The Greek word could only have been discovered by a Theologian in want of an argument. The German word is not put by the lexicographers in the list of words, but mentioned as a phrase which has been used. And, thank God, we are not bound to any arbitrary meaning that Cicero or

Mr. Trench or La Rochefaucauld may desire to impose on words which, though they may indicate dark human possibilities that man oftener speaks of than enters, nevertheless do not make an absolute badness any more possible than absolute blackness or whiteness.

Mr. Trench seems to have tried to establish a right of possession warranty. For it is against the fearful and false views of our nature, for his dogmas on an estate where they could obtain no other to which nearly all churches have more or less committed themselves, that the Word bears its most signal and inevitable testimony, and one which will justify our claim for it as incorruptible, where Religions and Letters falter. The long-faced brother, who is never weary of proving that man's natural element is sin, as that of a fish is water, could he ever go deeper than the shell of that wondrous volume under his belaboring fist, would find that therein the word to sin is *ἀπαράνω* — that is, to *miss something*; he might discover that man is not sent on earth to sin, but that sin is *a missing of* the design of a man's being. In the words by which sin and evil are described in human language, the profound and patiently-formed convictions of the human mind are confronting and refuting the conceits and phantasms of ephemeral theologies. To one who knows words, the fanatic is pledged to tell the truth; and whilst he denounces man as degraded, depraved, degenerate, etc., he is suggesting the question how man could be *de*-graded if he had no altitude from which to be brought down; how he could be *de*-generate if he were not of exalted *birth*-right? If man's nature is inherently vile, *manliness* (man-likeness) ought to be another name for excess of villainy; if the human heart is as hard as the nether millstone, a *humane* act must be the most grinding in its hardness. *Natural* affection would be lust. But the everlasting ages came forth with that voice of the people, which here at least is the voice of God, declaring that everywhere and forever bad acts shall be called *unnatural*, not *natural*, *unmanly*, not *manly*, brutal, not *human*; that virtue is one with the *vir* or *man*. The brave heart, though in the light of the past it can not be content with men, turns away from the husks of theology given him by the Churches, to be led by one who said of the prodigal that "he came to himself," not that he denounced or mistrusted, or left off reliance on himself. He has pondered well the saying of the wise man, *Whoso sinneth wrongeth his own soul*.

So also when the transient and purblind sentiment of which the Church, and even Literature, are too often the willing slaves, would lift up diseased prejudices against eternal laws, words are the soldiers which can never be bribed or browbeaten to their behests, but even in their seeming coöperation are sapping and mining their defences. Spoken with harshest tone, written with ink mingled with gall, very thick in this time as in all time fall the words latitudinarian, skeptic, heretic, freethinker; yet each word calls up the noble army of those in whose independent and heroic words and deeds the thunderstep of God in history and civilization has been heard. What does latitudinarian mean? Why, one who is *broad* and catholic; who will not bind to any dogmas of his own the salvation or excellence of others, and will admit that he may omit seeing one side of a sphere whilst looking at the other. Skeptic (*σκεπτομαι*) means, as we have seen, *one who considers*; and there is no more terrible satire on what the creeds have given men to believe, than the fact that the word skeptic has come to be almost synonymous with infidel; that is, *considering* these dogmas has proved the sure way to reject them. The same may be said of the word *heretic*; it is simply from *αἰρέω*, *to choose*, and signifies one whose own reason and conscience, and not those of another man or set of men, have decided what he shall or shall not believe. And that this word, signifying *to choose*, should popularly mean an unbeliever, states with the unconscious candor of words that men who have the choice of their own faith, heretics, have rarely been known to tie themselves to the creeds. The grandeur of the word *free-thinker* is written upon its face, and he who denounces free thought or rationalism (*ratio*-reason) must blaspheme God in his construction of the necessary functions of the human mind, and insult the noblest attributes of man!

These facts show sufficiently the power and superiority of words. They show that whilst Literature marks sentimental or possible states, the word marks a real elevation, and states with incorruptible simplicity. Thus far man reached; This he believed! Words are thus sifted and condensed Literatures. They do not share the suspicion which must rest upon the tendency of this generation, to resolve itself into TALK, and to satisfy the world with what Richter calls the "paper nobility." Such wise and now proverbial expressions as "One should be silent or say something better than silence;" "Speech is silver, silence golden," and this

fine sentence of Carlyle's, "So much the more the disposition in thee to *say* the thing, so much the less will there be in thee to *do* it," — indicate unmistakably a higher Leader than the Tongue, the apotheosis of which has made the Church of this age the highway of Cant, and the State an excessively tiresome stump-speech. Is not the adoration of the Grand Llama of the East, worshipped with all the more awe because the veil has never been lifted from it, higher than a Church which reduces the Incomprehensible to a question of arithmetic, and leaves no Holy of Holies in the soul unprofaned by the hoof of babbling Dogmatism? Do any but fools talk whilst there is music, or beneath the glory of a sunset? Surely the profounder souls know that the deepest thing within can not be spoken, and come forth from their communion feeling with Paul that they have there heard "unspeakable things, which it is not lawful for a man to utter." In the *Desatir* or Persian Book of Prophets, we read: "The spider said, Wherein consisteth the superior excellence of man? The sage Simrash replied, Men understand talismans and magic arts, whilst animals do not. The spider said, Animals exceed man in these respects; knowest thou not that crawling things and insects build triangular and square houses without wood or stone? Behold my work, how without loom I weave fine cloth. Simrash answered, Man can write and express his thoughts on paper, whilst animals can not. The spider said, Animals do not transfer the secrets of Mezdram from a living heart to a lifeless body. Simrash hung down his head from shame."

We have seen that Speech is Nature bursting her chain for a nobler service, and, found only in man, records his history and announces his destiny; certifies also his connection on one side with the animal, on the other with absolute Being. This that we call human language was predicted in the first song of the first bird, which, a myriad ages before man appeared on earth, uttered the first note that invaded the ancient kingdom of Silence; and that effort to sing its little hymn of joy at its relation to the beautiful creation, was a prophesy fulfilled in the lisp of the first human child, which in its turn enfolded all eloquence and the highest vocalization. Swelling along the endless gamut of life, that first bird-warble not alone gushes at length from the throat of Malibran; for where vocalization ends the genius of man does not end, but weds its power with instrumentation; and the bird-note,

now winged with the instrumentation of Beethoven, passes on, leaving men on earth to be the language of archangels.

But still is silence Alpha and Omega—its kingdom was first and shall be last! Action will speak louder than the word, and the best in each not seek to flow out at the lips, but remain within to transform all and radiate in the unconscious presence and life! This eager searching into our words and languages is the sign of their transition; we are seeing through this illusion of rhetoric; “when we dream that we dream, we are near to waking.” It has already startled certain living writers, that their writing out their thought is a lame apology for not living it; and there is a sad tone under the best writing of the day.

Who that has heard the Messiah of Handel, does not remember that finest chorus of the sublime work, *For unto us a child is born?* When in that chorus the words of Isaiah seem nearest the threshold of the Infinite, and the spirit of Handel is in its highest rapture, and we feel flooded with the too much glory, as the thousand voices rise to their climax in THE MIGHTY GOD—there is a sudden silence! In that silence the music of all music is heard, and the reverent soul knows that should the morning stars sing together for joy, and the angels unite in the choir, they could in their highest note only uplift the spirit to the threshold of the more godlike silence.

WALDEN WOODS.

Leaves are heaped upon leaves on the rustling walks of the woodland —
There they fall and decay, wearisome year upon year;
So are the men and women who find not the fugitive moment
Rich in work and results, dull and poor as it seems.
Never afar, believe me, lurks the goddess Occasion,
Bearing before her the task, hiding the glorious prize:
Hast thou eyes to behold her, and quick ears to catch the music
Of her delicate wings hovering over thy way?
Then shall thy days be blithe, thy memory fresh and fragrant.
Be the unresting wind, not the withering leaf!

WALDEN WATER.

SEE Walden shining in the sun,
And creeping up to kiss the feet
Of oak and pine and drooping birch,
Whose tremulous forms his waves repeat.

This green abyss, this lucid well,
Gives glimpses into endless peace :
Come rest with me beside the brink,
And let thine idle labor cease.

From whispering tree and billow bright,
From silent sky and wandering cloud,
A sweet persuasion steals o'er all,
And soothes the sad and tames the proud.

As softly lies the brooding light,
And fair the flitting shadow falls,
So gently in these better hours
The sacred voice of Nature calls.

THE NATURE OF MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY.

By the late JAMES P. ESPY, author of "Philosophy of Storms," etc.

SCIENCE has demonstrated that this earth was once fluid, from heat, to the surface ; it follows that man has not existed on this earth from eternity, and it is manifest that the first man had not a man for his father, nor the first woman a woman for her mother ; and as there is no known cause now in existence to produce man, but that of ordinary generation, and as it is plainly impossible for him to have originated from any fortuitous concourse of atoms, we are constrained to believe that the first man and first woman were contrived and brought into existence by a being of superior wisdom, power and goodness. And as this same reason applies to all the animals and vegetables on the face of the earth, we may safely infer that the power, wisdom and goodness of this being are indefinitely great. This inference is greatly confirmed, when we dis-

cover innumerable contrivances, both in the moral and physical world, all tending to the well-being of man.

Now all these contrivances imply a contriver, and unless this contriver was himself contrived, he must have been eternal. For it is certain, that the first cause or contriver always existed, for if there was even a time when nothing existed, nothing could ever have been brought into existence, — *ex nihilo nihil fit*. This first self-existent and eternal cause or contriver is called God, whether the immediate contriver of the universe was the self-existent eternal first cause or not. But as nothing is gained by supposing that the contriver of the universe, and the former of man, was himself or itself contrived, it is unphilosophical to make the supposition.

When we examine the nature of man, we discover that he is so constituted or contrived, that the fundamental law of his nature is to be *fond of pleasure and averse to pain*. Indeed, as a sensitive being, it would seem he could not be formed otherwise. We find, also, that he is so contrived as to be able to discover by degrees more and more the causes which produce pleasure, and the causes which produce pain. The sum of human happiness is much increased by the contrivance God has made, that one of the principal sources of man's enjoyment is doing good to others, or endeavoring to increase their happiness. We find, also, that doing evil to others, or even designing to do evil, is always attended with pain, and no doubt more suffering is felt by the evil-doer than by the one to whom the evil is done.

God has so formed the human race, that one man's true interest or well-being never clashes with another's; or, in other words, one man is never under the necessity of diminishing the well-being of another, to promote his own happiness.

If man was so constituted that he could promote his own happiness by diminishing that of others, the very constitution of man would then be a species of bribery in God, offering happiness as a reward for doing evil to others. If God is perfectly wise and perfectly good, he has not so constituted man. Indeed, if we allow that the great First Cause is without intelligence and incapable of design, and that man was formed by a fortuitous concurrence of atoms, which is infinitely improbable, still by examining his constitution as it is we will be obliged to acknowledge that doing good to others is a source of pleasure, and doing evil to others is

a source of pain. If man is never under the necessity of doing evil to others, or of diminishing their happiness to increase his own, *a fortiori*, God is never under the necessity of diminishing the happiness of one man for the good of another.

Pain of every kind which does not result in the ultimate good or well-being of the individual suffering it, is an evil to him, and, of course, it can not promote the well-being of others; and if inflicted by others, it will diminish their happiness, probably, more than it does that of the individual on whom it is inflicted. All punishment, therefore, ought to be inflicted with the intention of benefiting the individual punished; for if it results in diminishing the well-being of the individual punished, it certainly will diminish the well-being of those who inflicted it—more especially if the punishment is inflicted without regard to the well-being of the sufferer.

Punishment, therefore, to be just and useful (and it can not be just without being useful), should be prospective, and not retrospective; and it contains a false and dangerous doctrine to say a man ought to be punished *for* his transgressions, if this form of speech is understood literally. The truth is, he ought to be punished only *for* the sake of reformation or discipline,—and this is the only mode in which God ever punishes, as will appear more fully hereafter.

This doctrine, when once admitted, will remove all vengeance from the mind; for every one will see, that to punish with the feelings of vengeance is to punish oneself. Thus the criminal code of all nations will be freed from its foulest blot, the open avowal and practice of the principle that it is just to punish for the good of the community—in some cases, at least—without any regard than can possibly be inculcated and embraced; for it teaches men to the good of the criminal. This is the most pernicious doctrine to believe, from their infancy to manhood, that they may (at least, sometimes) benefit themselves by diminishing the well-being of others: and it never occurs to them that it is false; for it is a doctrine embraced by the State, and lies at the very foundation of their criminal code.

The extreme perniciousness of this principle will clearly appear, when we perceive, as we may by a little consideration, that *from this one error all our wicked conduct to others arises*. Remove the belief that we can benefit ourselves by doing evil to others, and

implant in its place the belief that we shall be the principal sufferers by such conduct, then all motive to do evil to others is at once cut off; and with the absence of motive the action will, of course, not be performed. If this doctrine is true, the evil done to a community by one legalized murder (the execution of a criminal) is infinitely greater than the most atrocious murder ever committed by an individual, because it teaches, in the most effectual manner, the principle from which all murders and other crimes arise; and, besides, the moral feeling of the community, by the practice of capital punishments, is rendered callous, to a degree beyond calculation.

Men are so constructed by the Creator that they perform every day thousands of good actions, without considering for a moment whether happiness or misery will be the result; but they seldom, if ever, commit a crime without calculating the consequences. Their moral arithmetic, however, deriving its rules of calculation from the criminal code of nations, is false, and they determine to do evil to their fellow-creature from the expectation of increasing their own well-being. In this expectation they must fail, as certainly as a just God stands at the head of the universe; for it would be in the highest degree wicked to bribe his creatures with happiness as a reward or consequence of doing evil one to another. As it is manifestly not good for an individual to be punished for any crime, when it is impossible for that punishment to work reformation, or benefit to the individual in any other way, so it is manifestly unjust to inflict such punishment, and it would be infinitely cruel to continue such punishment to all eternity.

God being perfectly wise and perfectly good, he must, from his very nature, intend to do some good in every thing which he does; whenever he punishes any of his creatures, therefore, or, which is the same thing, causes pain to be the necessary consequence of crime, he must intend to do that creature good by the pain, more especially as this is the only way to improve the individual, and thus also to benefit others.

As God certainly does punish—that is, cause pain to be the inevitable consequence of certain actions, which we therefore call evil actions—we are sure he will succeed in doing the good which he intends by that punishment; for he is all-wise to lay his plan, and all-powerful to execute it. Now the only good conceivable to result from punishment is the reformation of the individual, or

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the happiness of others ; and as these are inseparable, the reformation of the individual must be effected. Nor is it difficult to conceive *how* this is done. God has made man fond of happiness, and averse to misery ; it is a law of his nature which never varies. He can not change it, either by volition or crime ; he can not will to hate happiness and love misery any more than he can suspend gravitation by a word of command.

God has made man also with an intellect capable of finding out by experience more and more of those things which produce misery, and also more and more of those things which produce happiness. Now the wiser he becomes, the wiser will be his volitions ; that is, the more and more of those things which produce happiness he will choose, and the more and more of those things which produce misery he will avoid ; and when he becomes perfectly wise, if that time shall ever come, he will then by no possibility choose to do any wicked action, because a perfectly wise being cannot choose to make a foolish volition. Nor does this impossibility of choosing to make foolish or wicked volitions in the slightest degree impair his free agency ; for, on such a supposition, God is not a perfect free agent, as, from the very perfection of his nature, he can not choose to make a foolish or wicked volition, or perform any wicked action. It has been thought by some that free agency, or moral accountability, implies at least the possibility of choosing to do either good or evil ; but this can not be, for, on this plan, God would not be a free agent ; and man, too, would be less and less a free agent the wiser he became, and when he became perfectly wise, he would cease to be a free agent altogether. It is maintained also by some, that it would be unjust in God to cause pain to follow as a consequence of any action, if that action could not have been avoided. So far from this being correct, it will appear by a little reflection that it is entirely consistent with the highest benevolence to cause pain to follow the commission of crimes, or the formation of wicked volitions, as this is the only means of enabling the agent to make good volitions in future. It may perhaps be objected that God could not have intended to produce the greatest possible amount of happiness when he created man, or he would have created him so perfect in knowledge that he never could choose to do any act from which pain would result. It may be answered that God is only beginning to create man when he is born ; and that it is impos-

sible, so far as we know, to create him faster in knowledge than he is actually being created, whilst he remains in this world. And, besides, we may safely infer, that if it would be better for man to have been created in any other way, God, from his infinite perfections, would have chosen that way.

The justice of punishment does not depend on the fact that it was possible for the individual punished to have avoided the crime committed, but rather on the fact that the being who is punished is created with powers and capacities which may be operated on by the punishment itself, so as to render it possible and even certain, that, with the new motives introduced by the punishment, or by the pain following the commission of the crime, as an effect, he will be finally taught to avoid the crime *in future*. Unless the individual punished is so created, all punishment would be useless to him, and, of course, useless to others. If retrospective punishment could cause a crime which has been committed not to be, then it might be useful; but this is impossible and absurd. Nor is the absurdity of punishing retrospectively lessened by supposing that the individual punished could have avoided doing the criminal act; for, even on that supposition, the act once done can not be prevented, nor in any way altered by the punishment.

On some of the points here discussed the human mind seems to be differently constituted, and to take different views, after the most careful and patient examination. Some think that though God knew from all eternity all the actions which I perform in my whole life, yet I might have avoided many of them, if not all, and might perform an entirely different set; otherwise it would be unjust in God to cause pain or punishment to be the result of any of them. Others acknowledge that foreknowledge implies inevitability; but as foreknowledge is not the cause of the inevitability, they think God may be just in punishing for crimes or vices, provided he only foresaw these vices, but did not decree them. Now my mind is so constituted that it appears to me that if our actions were foreknown to God from all eternity, they must have been decreed by him. For foreknowledge implies the certainty that the event foreknown will come to pass. Now this certainty, or, which is the same thing, this inevitability of the event, must have been caused by something in God, or something out of God. If it was something in God, it must have been his decree or determination, either to cause the events to come to pass, or to bring

into existence a set of causes which would certainly bring into existence the events foreknown; for, if there was no certainty that the events would take place, then they could not be foreknown. Now, if God decreed to bring these effects into existence, or to bring a set of causes into existence which he knew would certainly produce the effects, then may he be said to have decreed the effects. On the other hand, if God did not decree to bring the effects foreknown into existence himself by his direct agency, nor to create any set or train of causes which would certainly produce the effects foreknown, then something out of God was the cause of the certainty, on which God's foreknowledge was founded, or which God's foreknowledge implies. Now, whatever this something is, it must be superior to God in power, for it is supposed to have caused a most important train of events in the moral world to be certain, and that, too, independent of any agency in God. Nay, more: not only will they come into existence without the agency of God, but he has no power to hinder them; for that can not be prevented from coming to pass which any being knows will certainly come to pass. To believe, then, that God foresaw the future actions of men, and at the same time to deny that he was himself the cause of that certainty or inevitability that the events foreknown would take place, on which the foreknowledge was founded, leads to atheism, or at least to a belief that God is a very weak and imperfect being; for, inasmuch as it is assumed that the certainty or inevitability was not caused by him, and as it is clear that, when an inevitability is once in existence, the thing inevitable can not be prevented from coming to pass, the Deity is left powerless in regard to the events taking place or not taking place. If it is said that the inevitability arose from something out of God, but that the subsequent agency of God had to be employed to bring the very beings into existence whose acts were inevitable, and thus he was not powerless in relation to these acts, still, even on this scheme, there would be a power above God, which is atheism. Or, if this power, which causes things to be inevitable, does this with intelligence and goodness, then this power is God, and the being who creates man is an inferior agent, which the superior uses to execute his plans, and bring into existence those things which he had rendered inevitable, or, which is the same thing, which he had decreed.

Another will object to all these views, and say the only plan to

render man a free agent is to suppose that there is no certainty or inevitability, which amounts to the same thing, as it relates to its influence on the character of actions, and consequently there can not be a foreknowledge of the actions of a free agent. This view is founded, as was said before, on the assumption that free agency, or moral accountability, implies the possibility of choosing to do either right or wrong, in every case, where a choice is made; or, as it is vaguely expressed, the agent is free to choose the right or the wrong. If those who take this view of the subject will institute a careful examination of what can be meant here by the word "*free*," they will, I think, find reason to change their views. If they suppose that the volitions are free from the intelligence and passions of the agent, and also free from the desire of happiness or aversion to misery, which is the universal law of all beings endowed with feeling, then is there no such thing as that kind of free agency for which they contend. If they come to the conclusion, as I think they must by such an examination, that our volitions are not entirely free from the influence of our state of mind as to intelligence, and our clearness of view as to the character of the object, to produce happiness or misery, at the time of willing or choosing, then I desire them to push the inquiry still further, and inquire how *much* influence the intelligence and state of mind may exercise on the volitions or choices which the agent makes without destroying his freedom or moral accountability.

In pursuing this inquiry to its utmost extent, my mind leans strongly to the conviction that all the time man is increasing in wisdom and goodness, the possibility of his making foolish and wicked volitions is constantly diminishing, and his power to make wise and good volitions is increasing in the same proportion, and thus all that kind of agency or power of acting which is of any value is retained and augmented. And whether any one may choose to call this power of making volitions under the influence of wisdom and goodness free agency or not, is a matter of little consequence, provided the fact itself is clearly perceived.

If we push our inquiry still further, we will perceive that our volitions, like all things which begin to exist, are produced by causes adequate to produce them, each particular volition depending on its own particular set of causes, adequate to produce that very volition and no other at the time. The particulars going to make up the cause are numerous, and if any one of these particu-

lars should be removed, the particular volition made at that time would be different. For example, suppose we make a volition which is the result of much deliberation. It is manifest that there are three particulars coëxisting as causes of this volition, and that if any one of them had been wanting at the time, the volition could not have been made. These three are the being who chooses or wills, the object of the choice, and the intelligence with which the deliberation is made. Other particulars, doubtless, enter into the complex compound going to make up the cause of the volition, and whatever they may be, they are adequate to produce the particular volition, and no other. Now, it is manifest that the particular volition of which we are speaking is inevitably produced by its complex cause at the moment it comes into existence; and, therefore, if free agency depends upon the possibility of making a different volition every time we make a volition, then free agency in that sense does not, and can not exist. Nor is it desirable that such a free agency should exist, for a being so constituted that his intelligence should not influence his volitions, would be a monstrosity of which we could form no conception — certainly he would not be a moral agent. Such a being could never be taught, and even if he could become intelligent, his intelligence would be of no use, for his volitions not being influenced by his understanding, he would be as likely to make foolish or ignorant volitions after he became intelligent as before. But the proposition is so absurd in itself that it seems impossible to attempt to reason from it without uttering absurdities. It is almost as if we were to suppose our uncle to be our aunt, and then to endeavor to find out what would be the consequences of such a supposition.

There is another consequence flowing from the supposition that there is not a necessary and indissoluble connection between the volitions and the causes of those volitions, which the advocates of this view of the subject little suspect. It is, that man on this principle would not be an accountable being; or, in other words, it would be utterly useless to punish him after he had committed any crime, with the expectation that the punishment would be of any use. It is true, punishment would produce new views, if it was so arranged that he would perceive it to follow as a consequence of the transgression: but what good would that do? His future volitions, according to the supposition, could not be affected by these new views. Thus it appears that the very principle

which those who advocate this view of the subject bring forward as the very essence of moral accountability, would render accountability absurd if it was true. Indeed, the only scheme on which moral accountability can be founded is that of the necessary connection between cause and effect; or the doctrine that the volitions are dependent on causes, and that among these causes is the state of intelligence and a knowledge of the consequences which will flow from the volitions themselves.

On this supposition, if a man should violate the law of God—that is, the law of his own nature—it would be useful, just and benevolent in the Deity to cause pain to be the immediate result, so that this new knowledge might become a new cause of producing a volition corresponding to the law of God on the next occasion. This, in fact, is the only mode which could be adopted to educate him out of a state of ignorance into a state of knowledge; and the more rapidly he committed transgressions, and the more rapidly the consequent pain came upon him, the faster it would seem he would rise into knowledge and happiness. On the contrary, if God had made man so that no pain would follow the transgression of his laws, but pleasure, then would man never learn to avoid transgression. And the consequences of such an arrangement are as impossible to foresee as it would be to foresee the consequences which would follow if our uncle were our aunt. On this subject to know what *is* is the only science. Is it a fact that pain is a consequence of the transgression of God's laws? Is it a fact that this pain has a tendency to educate us into a knowledge of those laws? Is it not better that we should be educated on this subject, than remain ignorant? Could we be so educated if pain did not follow transgression as an effect follows its cause? Many would be willing to admit that, provided men do transgress, it is better pain should follow, for the reason assigned above; but they can not admit that it is *better to transgress*—and this is the chief reason why they are unwilling to believe that God decreed the transgression. If, indeed, it proved that God is a malevolent being, provided he has decreed transgressions of his law, as well as the pain which follows these transgressions, then no argument, however strong, would be sufficient to satisfy the mind of the certainty of such decrees. It would remain forever perplexed between the force of the argument, and the absurdity of the conclusion. It is not probable, *a priori*, that God has

created the human mind so as to remain in a state of perplexity forever on so important a point. The search for truth is indeed one of the highest enjoyments of the human mind; and I can well appreciate the saying of one who delighted in the study of God's works, when he declared, "If God should hold out *Truth* to him in one hand, and the *search for Truth* in the other, and allow him to take his choice, he would say, Give me the *search for Truth*." Much of our pleasure, however, in the search for truth, arises from the continual discoveries of truth itself, and from the hope of making more. But if we should despair of ever arriving at the truth on a particular subject, our pleasure in the search would cease, and with the termination of the pleasure the search itself would cease.

How much of our happiness in a future state of existence will depend on the search for truth, we have no means of knowing. Perhaps we may *there* be able to investigate the causes of things, and discover the connection which exists between cause and effect; *here* we can only generalize facts themselves, and trace them up to general principles, without being able in any case to investigate the origin of those principles, or even discover how it is possible that anything should begin to be. Perhaps we shall be able to see with the clearness of certainty what we now can only render probable by a laborious train of reasoning, that everything which is possible *is*, and everything which is not is impossible at the present time.

One argument which renders this proposition probable is founded on the perfections of God. If we assume that, because God is omnipotent, he could have caused something to exist now which does not exist, it may be predicated of that thing that it is better it should exist than not exist, or worse that it should exist than not exist, or that its existence would be neither good nor evil. Now, the infinite goodness of God implies not only that all which he does is best, but that he will not omit to do anything which it would be better to do: and to say that God can not do anything contrary to his own infinite goodness, or contrary to his own will—which, from his nature and perfections, must be infinitely good—surely does not limit his omnipotence. It follows, that if it is better that the thing should be than not to be, God, from his very perfections, must have willed to bring it into existence, or to lay a train of causes which would bring it into existence, at

the very time when it would be best for it to exist. And as God is the author of all things which exist, either directly or indirectly, and as nothing can exist contrary to his will, it follows that it is in conformity with the will of God that whatever is now, should be now, and nothing else. Therefore, unless there is some flaw in this reasoning which I can not detect, it is true, at each moment of time, to say, Everything which is possible is; or, which is the same thing, Nothing is possible which is not. Nor is the truth of this proposition at all incompatible with the omnipotence of God; for the reason why nothing can be now but what is now exists in the perfections of God, and not in any hindering power out of God.

Thus it appears that all the transgressions of the law of God which take place are not only inevitable, but that they are inevitable because they are the best and only occurrences which could take place.

The objection which almost all would make to this conclusion is anticipated: Why praise men for some acts, and blame them for others, if they are both the very best possible? I answer that, as praise and blame rise spontaneously in every human mind, if these emotions are inconsistent with the above reasonings, the presumption against the reasoning would be very strong, if not conclusive. But there is, indeed, no inconsistency; for the same reasoning which proves whatever is is best at the present, proves that a change is best for the future,—and praise and blame are introduced to operate on the volitions of men, or as causes to produce new volitions and new actions. It does not follow that, because all the transgressions of the laws of God which occur are useful, therefore others which do not occur would be useful. On the contrary, the same reasoning which proves the former to be useful, proves that the latter would be injurious. God, therefore, has implanted in the human mind the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, and has caused praise to be agreeable to us, and blame disagreeable, that these emotions may be links in the great chain of cause and effect—to be the means of bringing into existence just such volitions as he foresees will be the best.

If it is replied that when men praise for good actions it is under the impression that the person praised could have done bad actions instead of good; and when they blame, it is under the impression that the person blamed could have avoided the action

blamed; and that men themselves feel self-condemned for certain actions under the impression that they might have avoided them,—I answer, that these impressions do not prove the fact. If you examine men on this point, you will find that they have no distinct notions on the subject: most of them will say that they are free to do as they please, and this is the whole amount of their knowledge on the subject. Now, this is undoubtedly true. They are free to do as they please. If you ask them if they are free to do as they do not please, or if they are free to please contrary to the way they please, you will find that they have never thought on the subject; so that the real question, whether anything which a man does through his whole life could be avoided or not, has never entered their mind. How, then, can their impressions—or, as they sometimes call it, consciousness—decide the question? If they examine the subject, so as to form any distinct notion of it, they will acknowledge that the action follows inevitably from the will or choice or volition; and that after a man pleases or wills to do a thing, the thing will be done, of course. If we will to move our arm, the arm moves: there is a necessary connection between the volition and the motion of the arm. To say that a man may move his arm or not, just as he pleases, is not deciding the question whether, if he does move his arm, he might have avoided that action. It is indeed plain that, after he willed to move it, it was no longer possible to avoid it.

It may be objected that, if men were taught to believe this doctrine, they would never blame themselves or others, because the sentiment of blame or sorrow for transgression could not spring up under the full belief that the transgression was unavoidable. I answer, that we never can become indifferent to pain under any system of instruction, or under any belief, as to the inevitability of actions. Pain will always be disagreeable to us, and the actions known to be productive of pain—as the transgression of the laws of God must be—will always be disapproved, unless we see clearly that they are intended for good.

It is true, that all which is bitter and resentful in blame will cease, but all which is instructive and amendatory will remain. When the one who is blamed perceives that there is nothing but kindness and instruction in the blame—no resentment nor vengeance, no relation to the past, but merely a desire to operate on the future—it will be more efficient in producing reformation than

it has heretofore been ; and, besides, the pain of resentful feelings, which has heretofore been very great, will be altogether avoided in the one who blames. The sum of human happiness will be vastly increased when men shall be educated up to a state of intelligence and virtue, in which they will clearly perceive that resentments are implanted in the human mind only to operate in the lowest states of ignorance, and that God uses them only as a scaffold to build up the temple of knowledge and virtue in the human mind—or rather to lay the foundation of this temple—and when this is done, the scaffold ought to be removed as cumbersome and unsightly. Some have thought that, because God has implanted resentment in the human mind, it was intended that this feeling should never become extinct—or, in other words, that what God creates he intends to be eternal ; but we have no proof of this : many races of animals have become extinct, and creation is in perpetual change. Man is born entirely ignorant, and his progress from one degree of knowledge and virtue to another is truly a new creation. Man is evidently not made perfect at once ; he was, however, evidently made to *rise*, and not to *fall*—to advance towards perfection, and never to retrograde ; and this great destiny he will fulfil. The motive of fear is useful in the lowest states of human intelligence and virtue ; but as soon as higher motives can be implanted, fear ceases to operate, and the higher motives become much more efficient.

Even duty itself, which is thought by some to be the highest motive which can actuate the human mind, will become obsolete in the highest states of intelligence and virtue ; for it is the nature of all higher motives to render useless and inoperative those of inferior quality. Now, the highest of all possible motives to be good is the love of goodness itself. Take the exercise of any of the virtues, for example, and the truth of the assertion will be manifest. What is the highest motive to tell the truth, at all times, but the love of truth itself, and the pleasure we experience in telling the truth ? When the love of truth is once firmly established in our minds, we never avoid lying from the fear of detection, nor do we tell the truth from a sense of duty any more than we eat a ripe peach from a sense of duty, and not from the pleasure of the taste.

The man who loves honesty does not avoid sheep-stealing from the fear of detection ; he has no taste for the thing, and if he was

sure he would never be detected, he would have no desire to do the act—the certainty of concealment would be no temptation; and if the idea of stealing never enters into his head in such a way as to induce him to deliberate a moment whether he will steal or not, it is manifest that he does not abstain from stealing through a sense of duty. Even those who maintain that duty is the highest motive would greatly prefer to have an affectionate wife rather than a dutiful one. Indeed, the moment I hear a woman praise herself for being a *dutiful* wife, I am sure she has not much domestic happiness in the conjugal state.

Love is a much higher and better motive, for two reasons: It is always at its post, ready to do its work—it never slumbers; but duty is not always present to the mind—it has to be called up by the mind, and sometimes will not come when called; thus it is not so *efficient* as love. In the second place, duty does not afford so much *happiness* as love, even when it prompts us to perform the same actions; and that motive is undoubtedly the best which produces the highest enjoyment—especially if it is, at the same time, most efficacious in producing good volitions and virtuous actions. Indeed, the abstaining from vicious actions through the fear of punishment hardly deserves the name of virtue; and abstaining from any vice through a sense of duty has a less degree of virtue in it, than abstaining from the same vice through a hatred of the vice and a love of the opposite virtue.

It is an interesting thing to examine how many different motives may actuate the mind in the same line of conduct. For example, the study of science or literature: A youth may engage in this study from a desire to please his parents, and from this motive alone. Presently he may feel the spirit of emulation or a desire of fame springing up in his bosom; if this feeling becomes very strong, it will supplant the other entirely, and the first motives will be forgotten. Presently ambition may supplant emulation in the same way, and this being a stronger motive than either of the others when it takes deep root, it will stimulate the man to great exertions in the acquisition of knowledge.

But if the highest of all motives should spring up in the mind—the love of knowledge, and an unspeakable enjoyment in the discovery of truth—then all inferior motives, even ambition itself, will be forgotten as if they had never been; as there is no longer any use for them they may well cease to exist. They are, in fact,

like resentment and anger, the mere scaffolding which God uses to build up the mind to a lofty state of excellence, and when this is accomplished the scaffolding is thrown down. I can conceive of no higher motive than the love of truth and the love of goodness. It is probable, therefore, that when this motive once takes root it will flourish to all eternity as the prevailing motive in all our conduct. And as our happiness will consist in the search and discovery of truth and in the practice of goodness, it will be impossible for the motive ever to change.

It may perhaps be objected by some, that, if anger and resentment should cease to spring up in our minds when we are injured and insulted, great evil would result, for no other motive would stimulate us to inflict that chastisement on the offender which his conduct deserves. Thus, he would never be cured of his evil, and we would be subject to the continual repetition of the insult or injury. If this is really a true statement of the case, and if the evils here anticipated would really flow from the annihilation of anger and resentment, the objection is unanswerable, and would prove that God never intends these feelings to become extinct.

But are we sure that kindness and gentleness on our part towards the insolent would be less efficient in curing them of their insolent feelings towards us, and their disposition to do us injury, than conduct dictated by anger or resentment? So far from this being the case, it is as true in the moral world as in the material, that "action and reaction are equal and in opposite directions." Treat a man with harshness, and harshness will be returned—treat him with kindness, and kindness will be returned; at least, this is the case in the lower stages of his existence. As soon as a man rises high enough to perceive this law, why not take advantage of it? Why not treat the insolent with kindness, and thus "*overcome evil with good?*" Until a man is far advanced in knowledge and virtue he will not be able to act on this principle; but as soon as he can he will perceive it will be better both for him and the offender, because he himself will avoid the great pain of anger, and the offender will be more effectually cured. By the law of retaliation the offender might be restrained from insolent *conduct* in future, but by the law of kindness the very disposition or desire to be insolent would forever cease to exist. If even a few men should not only *act* kindly but *feel* kindly towards those who maltreat them and revile them, the beneficent effects of such conduct

would be so apparent and so great that many would hasten to imitate so sublime an example, and an unspeakable amount of good would speedily be the result.

It is extremely hard, however, in the present state of society, for any to rise so high in their moral advancement as to act and feel thus, especially as they are educated during all the early part of their lives, when they are incapable of thinking for themselves, to believe in the law of retaliation, and when they see every one act on that principle and no one ever calls it in question. If children were taught from their earliest infancy, both by precept and by the example of their parents and all around them, that they must never return evil for evil, but to *bless them who curse them*, who can tell the mighty influence this system would have on the peace and happiness of the world in one generation?

But even in the present low state of moral advancement—low in comparison of what it will be in future times—the man who shall exhibit the sublime moral spectacle of kindness of feeling and gentleness of deportment towards one who treats him with insult and contumely, will produce a much more lasting and beneficial impression on all who witness the scene, than another who returns evil for evil.

[To be Continued.]

ON PRAYER.

My attention has been drawn to prayer by the exhibition it has made of itself—or that has been made of it—in the case of John Brown. From that point the view has been somewhat extended.

John Brown's undertaking has been opprobriously called a *raid* upon Virginia. Call mine, if you please, a raid upon Christianity. Call it what you please. It is war upon superstition. As such it shall yet obtain recognition, as sure as light is to shine on paths where now men are walking in darkness. John Brown's work aimed at the unchaining of four millions: my work aims at the unchaining of more than forty times four millions, whose chains are more than forty thousand times as heavy as those forged for the victims of American despotism. Not that my weights and measures are to be found showing too light an estimate of Amer-

ican usurpation and cruelty. More thorough investigation shall convince that no weights or measures have yet been found or instituted by which to expose the comparative usurpation and cruelty of superstition. The refined ruffianism of a *praying* Christianity, the imposed fear of a god, the extorted love of an infinite, inexorable tyrant, that can smite down, awe, and humble into praying posture such men as John Brown; religion, that binds compulsorily, with chains weighty enough to restrain mankind from rising into knowledge of their own proper position in the universe—subjecting them to the rapacity of those who make merchandize of them for their own gratification, and the glory of so-called gods, which are the workmanship of their own hands, fabricated for instrumentalities in their dehumanizing business: these are enormities and oppressions for which measures and weights are yet to be instituted.

The strength of slavery is in the ignorance of the slaves. This is as true in the higher conditions of subserviency as in the lower. The naturally noble horse could not be led about and tied up with a thong, if he only knew. His masters, for their own safety, and the security of their interests in using him, have to educate him into ignorance of his own powers. So of the higher order of animals, used by their masters for producing cotton and sugar: these have to be educated in the same downward direction. So also of a higher grade of a kindred order of animals, used by *their* masters for building steeple-houses—which are intellectual slaughter-houses—and for keeping a race of masters educated into knowledge of means for perpetuating their control: these used ones, too, have to be subjected to the same degrading discipline. The secret of success, in all this course of discipline, is *deception*. The quadrupeds that grass-growers plow with are deceived; the bipeds that cotton-growers plow with are deceived; so also are the bipeds of higher grade that priests plow with. One of these is just about as insusceptible as another of knowledge that would ennoble him. Whisper in the ears of jaded beasts, put Homer and Virgil within the reach of toilers on southern plantations, and you will be as well appreciated as in efforts to reach the slaves of Superstition with a Philosophy of Reason and Nature. Nevertheless, there are those so constituted they can not be happy without occasional efforts to disenfranchise and elevate the degraded things of their kind.

A vast amount of praying has been induced by John Brown's

movement: prayers both ways; prayers all ways; prayers for and prayers against; prayers North and prayers South; prayers to Jehovah, prayers to Jesus, and prayers to Mary; prayers for freedom and prayers for slavery. Who shall say whether these or those have been successful, or that either have availed in the least? Where or what is the evidence? The enemies of John Brown, and friends and supporters of slavery, have prayed for success in shedding his blood; and they have prevailed and succeeded. They who believe in prayer, and pray to gods, is it for them to deny that a god, who has advertised himself a "man of war," on hand for a job, ambitious for glory, and who has directed his favorites to make "bondmen and bondwomen for ever" of their neighbors, has been standing at the right hand of Henry A. Wise, in answer to the prayers of slave-owning and slavery-supporting saints, South and North? The editors of the *New York Observer*, *et id omne genus* — are they not *refined* men? are they not pious? are they not zealous and jealous for the glory of their gods? are they not of genuine Puritanic, John Calvin stock? have they not had education in the same theology with John Brown? All these prayed vociferously, magniloquently, not to say malignantly, to have John Brown killed — and he was killed. Now, if praying had anything to do with it, and the "man of war" had anything to do with it in answer to prayer, it seems legitimate to conclude that he must have been the direct, personal instigator and manipulator of the glorious military movement in Virginia, that will immortalize the men and the gods who have made the display. Those who have prayed to the contrary must admit that their god, to whom they have prayed, has at least *permitted* it to be as it has been: at any rate, that he has been unable or unwilling to avert it. What, then, the use of their prayers? Can they say more in reply here than that they have been *obedient* — have done the bidding of their book? Under the authority of the same book, John Brown has been killed, and slavery sustained. Is it said, "The wrath of man shall praise him, and the remainder of wrath he will restrain"? Why not restrain it all? Is the god in need of such praise, or does he delight in it? Who is benefited by it? If a god will do a thing, what is the use of praying for that thing to be done, or not to be done? If he will not do a thing, what the use, any more? If he is to be prayed into a process that he could not otherwise be got into, how he

to get at his decision? Is it to go with him by majority, or is it to be an affair of literature, of logic, of loquacity, of scholarship, or of rhetoric? or is it to be sympathy? And how is it to be known what channels to construct, or what mediums to provide, through which his sympathies will flow? If men are to be practical, they need to depend on something reliable. What is to be the motive power to bear on him—the influence under which he is to be brought?

If there be any propriety in the use of language, calling things false or true; if there be any such things as proprieties and improprieties, all the conditions of prayer are false and improper on the part of both parties concerned, including the requiring of prayer, and the yielding to the requirement. If it could be possible to suppose a creator of things, with perfect power, wisdom and goodness, it must follow that it would be the business of such a being to have all things right, nothing wrong; to have all things perfect, nothing imperfect. No business to have whining, crying, agonizing, distressed children. All wants should be anticipated by such a being—supplied before they are felt. The maker, or sufferer, of misery, who *delights* in it, is a monster of tyranny. The maker, or sufferer, of misery, who does *not* delight in it, is an impotent trifler. The idea of misery, then, under the control of a perfect creator and governor, is a matchless absurdity.* Why does any *father* ever suffer any of his children to be miserable? Simply, and only, because he has not the control of the circumstances to prevent it. He is deficient in the power, the wisdom, or the goodness—one, or more, or all. It does not do to make the exception here in favor of the more intelligent, and increase the propriety of the exception with the increase of intelligence. Directly and entirely the contrary. The better he *knows*, the better he should *do*. It does not satisfy to say: He has superior wisdom, and knows how to bring good out of evil,—let him therefore eat and drink to the production of drunkenness, lechery and scrofula, and beget children inheriting ruin, for the father's pleasure, honor and glory. The more the wisdom and power, the more the obligation to prevent misery. Perfect wisdom and power should prevent it all.

No good beings require prayer. On the other hand, none who know what belongs to their own dignity, and have discerned the

* Or a wisdom beyond our conception.—Ed.

propriety of things in their relations to others, will yield themselves to the degrading conditions, will suffer themselves to be dragged through, or in any way to be taken through the senseless mummery, in obedience to blinding traditions, in submission to requirements handed forward from their inferiors, restrained by dead oracles instead of being inspirited by living truths, charmed and chained by incantations from darkness behind, deaf and blind to inviting and inspiring developments from light before.

How can it be that the right or the wrong has the least consideration with any god prayed to? Where, or what is the evidence? How can Christians claim, with the least show of proof from manifestations made to them, that their god goes for the right? They will not, they dare not, undertake the production of the proof. They assume and assert, and when told that this is not sufficient, and called on for proof, they get off with the additional assumption that proof is not necessary, and that it is the height of audacity in unbelievers to call for it. As many of them as have bestowed a thought on it know too well that the preponderance of proof is against them; they know that, so far as any thing is manifest, their god is a faithless promiser, and not a faithful performer. Here they are brought back again to their book, to the bidding of their master, right or wrong. This is it: right or wrong. Right and wrong are out of the question; it is only for them to do as their book bids, as their master dictates — their book everything, they themselves nothing — the condition between all despots and despoiled.

To the book, then; to the Christian's part of it in particular. Their Great Teacher mocks and scouts formal prayers, praying indirectly, indefinitely, without a special purpose, and the expectation of a direct, immediate answer. He teaches them to pray for things to be done miraculously; to ask what they will, and it shall be granted at once, even to the removing of mountains and casting them into the sea; requires faith to this end and effect, and damns as many as fail of it. In immediate connection with pronouncing damnation for disbelief he follows with the tests, telling them of miraculous things they shall do, evince of their faith. In accordance with this teaching the show is kept up in the book for Peter, Paul and Silas, who it is stated were released from prison by the miraculous intervention of divine power, in answer to the prayers of the saints. Why, then, should not John

Brown, by like intervention prayed for and vouchsafed, have been miraculously delivered from the power of a most damnable despotism? He was a better man than either Peter or Paul. It is not recorded of him that he was ever guilty of betraying his Master, or of persecuting his Master's Church. Say not that miracles were more necessary to convince men in those days of ignorance, than they are in these days of intelligence. Exactly the contrary. It took less to delude then; it takes stronger proof now. If miracles could ever have been or ever be the things for proof, they are more necessary now than at any former period. Besides, the Catholic Church, the genuine Christian Church, has kept a record of miracles performed in answer to prayers down to the present time—exceptions to the rule, to be sure: not an answer to one prayer in a thousand, but a miraculous answer now and then; so that they can show their claims to being, in this respect, the true followers of their Master who left them the requirement. It is not, then, for Protestants to say that miracles ceased with the Apostles, so-called. The Catholics show to the contrary on authority as good as establishes any Christian miracle. Why do the Protestants pray? For the same reason that the Catholics do: their Master commands it. To whom was the command given? To the same ones commanded to work miracles, and in the same connection. Whoever is commanded to pray is commanded to exercise faith equal to the working of miracles; the obligations run coëxtensive. Not a word there imposing faithful prayer on one generation of disciples and faithless prayer on another generation.

Here is a specimen of modern Christian miracles. What was the object of this miracle wrought in answer to prayer? Was it only the relief of this single sufferer? Why are millions of other sufferers neglected? Was it, rather, the glory of the Christian's god? Would not the glory have been greatly enhanced by taking the neck of John Brown unharmed from the halter, and translating him before the eyes of his enemies? Rather, still, was it the good of mankind? Who, then, can calculate how superior must have been the effect for the purpose thus to have rescued John Brown?

But to the miracle. "Dr. T. L. Nichols, formerly of this city," says the *New York Evening Post*, "and of late years a proselyte to the Roman Catholic faith, gives the following account of what

he pronounces a miraculous cure, of which President Buchanan was a witness, in Washington. It is related in a lecture delivered in Troy, on the evening of December 7th :

"A few years ago there lived in the city of Washington a Mrs. Mattingly, a devout Catholic, of a very respectable family ; and a lady well known in the community in which she resided. She had been sick for seven years of a cancer in the stomach, which had progressed so far as to make its appearance on the surface, and had entirely crippled her in her arms. She was so weak and low of the disease, that often a mirror was placed before her face to see whether she was alive or not. Her disease was considered incurable by her medical attendants in Washington, and she was given over to die. When there was no other hope her friends wrote to a Hungarian prince, who was also a priest, a very devout and holy man, whose prayers had often been answered in his own country, and the fame of whose deeds had spread far and wide, in respect to her case. He replied, that on a certain day, at a certain hour, he would say mass in behalf of the sufferer, which should be celebrated in her presence at the same time, calculating the difference in longitude, and that she should also receive the holy communion. The period fixed upon arrived. She lay in bed, and it appeared that she was never so low as on that morning. The ceremony was performed, and she received the holy communion, although it was at first doubted whether she could survive it. In a moment after it was completed she arose from her bed, returned thanks, went down stairs and received the congratulations of over three hundred visitors, who came to rejoice over her recovery. All symptoms of disease had vanished, the ulcers had disappeared, and the cure was effected instantly. Among those present on that occasion was President Buchanan. The lady died in Washington three or four years ago. I could mention other cases as occurring in this country, but this one is sufficient for my purpose. I bring it forth as an attestation of the divine character of the Roman Catholic Church."

This is better authenticated than anything of the kind in the New Testament, by as much as it is nearer to us in time and place. It is certainly less in unreconciliation with nature than many of the New Testament pretensions. The idea that a supernatural god had anything to do with this or the other is to be rejected. A god who has knowledge of such calamities and power to remove them,

but will wait, like a doctor, to be called on before he will do it, and leave it undone if he is not called on—and perhaps if he is—is unfit to be employed; he is a worse being than we allow men to be. No good man, having self-sustaining power—being independent of compensation, having knowledge of suffering, and wisdom and means for its removal—would allow it to exist. Why are not all the cancers and other ills removed at once? Why have they not been prevented? Not for the want of *power* to do it—oh, no! but only for the want of disposition; then the want of good men to propitiate the power—to pray the power to be disposed to well-doing!

“Let fierce Achilles, dreadful in his rage,
The god propitiate, and the pest assuage.”

The necessities, then, in the case are good men; without these the gods are good for nothing. What, then, are the gods good for any how? To make us dependent on them for the good men, is to stretch the absurdity and aggravate the nonsense. They are no more reliable for furnishing us the good men to propitiate them than they are for doing the good work without being propitiated. The idea is, they will not do a good work for humanity till they are teased into it by good men! What, then, is to be the beginning process? Who is to tease for the making of the first good man—the first teaser? The difficulty is to get the thing started; and if it ever was started it is evident there has been no less difficulty in keeping it going, for lack on the part of propitiators or propitiated, or both.

It never has gone—it never started: the Philosophy of Nature has no cognizance of such doings. Whatsoever is salutary for the suffering can be accomplished by procuring the sympathy of those fitly organized for the purpose, far off or near, and is one of the processes of Nature that knows no superior, controlling, coöperating or interfering power. Prayers, miracles, and gods are human institutions; they have had a common origin, and will have a common destiny: undeveloped brains produced them, developed brains will dispense with them. An essential truth now needed to be known, at this point, appears to me simply this: it was the ignorance and folly of *those* days that was imposed upon by the pretension to miracles; it is the ignorance and folly of *these* days that is imposed upon by the record of the old imposture.

With all his praying, John Brown was a great and good man

and has made an abiding mark. The same is true of multitudes of others. If John Brown could have known enough to elevate himself above praying, he would have been a greater and better man, and more effective; if he had been more perfectly self-reliant, trusting nothing to an untrustworthy god, he must have laid better plans. He was deluded with the idea of miraculous help; he had always been praying to one who had no power to perform,—had been praying to and trusting a god who had pretended to take his favorites through a sea on dry land, drowning their enemies behind them; and others of his favorites out of a fiery furnace: and to another god—or the same incarnate—who had pretended to feed thousands out of the contents of a dinner bag, carried about on a man's arm or shoulder, for a dozen. If there be any philosophical propriety in lamentation, it may be allowable here to say it is a great pity that so great and good a man as John Brown could not have been educated into elevation above this. That a man of his natural powers, his virtue, his integrity, self-reliance, and self-control, should have been educated backward and downward into a degrading superstition—into a religion whose nature and work, whose very signification, is, to bind, and keep tied up, anchored with the injunction not to grow wise above what has been written—is deeply deplorable.

The fact that praying men have done some good things, innumerable good things, and done them well, is no evidence that praying has been instrumental of the good. Swearing men as well as praying ones have done good things, and done them well; but who will give credit to the swearing? The swearing men of Christendom to-day are as reliable for good faith, truth, generosity, catholicity, humanity, as the praying men. Praying and swearing are proximates; they are in intimate relations. It takes a superstitious believer, a believer in prayer, to be an accomplished swearer.

The bad in human conduct more than the good is clearly traceable to the influence of prayer. Read the 109th Psalm of David, a man after his god's own heart, and learn from it the character of a man preëminent in prayer, and of a praying man's god. Then take a lesson from the 20th chapter of Genesis; see in this how a praying prophet and his god could league together with lying intimidation to defraud and fleece a man of better integrity. Read the whole history of this prayer-imposing, prayer-hearing god,

and his praying favorites, coöperating for the subjugation and extermination of their neighbors; in it the murderers of John Brown will find justifying example and full sanction for subjecting those around about them to perpetual bondage. Read the history of the Christian sect itself, divided into countless sects, praying and wrangling, praying against each other, praying and fighting, *preying* and singing praise to their savage deity. Witness the *te-deums* at the massacres on St. Bartholomew's day in Paris, at Magdeberg, and on other like occasions, where the Christian's god was praised for the slaughter of heretics, as he is now for the slaughter of the enemies of slavery. The wars of Christendom, from first to last, have been carried on by praying men; the oppressions of Christendom have all been imposed and held on by the consecrating hands of praying men—pious men; and these wars and oppressions are at the present time, as they have been in past times, as inhuman, all things considered, as the sun shines upon, or as the darkness relieves from the sight of.

Prayer makes men reckless of human life. Whatever there was of seeming recklessness in John Brown's career is to be attributed to his having been a man of prayer—of faith in a "prayer-hearing, prayer-answering god," who might deliver him on earth, and, if he wouldn't do that, would save him in heaven. This faith, and praying and agonizing himself into excitement habitually in connection with it, must have had a tendency to make him reckless of human life, his own as well as that of others. In proportion to his sincerity, in expectation of going directly to a heaven that would better his condition, he would undervalue life; and how could he be more careful of the lives of his enemies in their bad cause than of his own in his good cause?

Prayer is an enemy to freedom of thought and of utterance. It palsies the tongue and muzzles the press. Thinking, and the expression of thought, lifts men from their knees and holds them on their feet. Thought and expression must, therefore, be suppressed for prayer's sake. There is not a praying man in Christendom but deprecates a faithful utterance of the best, the gravest, the most pregnant, the paramount convictions now teeming in human brains. Praying men are in fear—in fear of gods; gods made by men—men inferior to the best of the praying class. Free and faithful utterance would annihilate these gods and extinguish prayer; it would take away the occupation of the class whose business it is to keep the world of mankind in praying conditions.

Prayer is an enemy to science. Science comes in against all miracles. Of course, it finds an antagonist in prayer. If the time that has been squandered in prayer had been occupied in studying physiology—studying to know human conditions, human adaptations, human wants, and to know the best practical means for supplying those wants, in the use of productive industry,—there is no telling nor conceiving the distance we might have been ahead of where we now find ourselves in wisdom and happiness.

Prayer for pardon is license for crime. A year or two ago, in the city of New York, a man murdered his wife, the mother of his four children. The poor, miserable wretch confessed he had killed her because she was more than worthy of him; because her moral conduct was better than his, and her life was a reproach to him. He was condemned to be hung. As he was about to die, the priest exhorted him not to fear, assuring him that in a few minutes he would be in heaven! The least encouragement for pardon is so much license for lingering in evil ways. Hope for pardon is false and unnatural, in the proffer and the acceptance. Bad organizations are made worse by it; good ones can not be benefited by it, and do not need it. Every one is made better by being taught to stand responsible, in rectitude, and take the consequences. Let none but they who do well hope for the enjoyments that belong only to well-doers.

Praying promotes hypocrisy. Not that all praying men are hypocrites, but where there is frailty of organization in this direction, prayer makes things worse; and the naturally well fortified at this point it can make no better. To say the least of it, it tends to insincerity. No practical man will risk a dollar or a loaf of bread on it. If any one will undertake it, let him pray, and his neighbor plow, and see who has bread. Prayer never made a bushel of grain, an honest man, nor good neighborhood. It has helped to make millions of hypocrites, piratical priests and robbers. The Christian Master himself reproved those who "for a pretense made long prayers," denouncing them as hypocrites. Now why is a *long* prayer worse than a *short* one, except by the amount of its length? Prayer is prayer—hypocrisy is hypocrisy. If a long prayer has the effect to strengthen hypocritical tendencies, a short prayer has its proportion of the same effect. That Teacher did well in "heading in" this branch of religious rottenness: he would have done better in removing the entire branch. He would

have done it, no doubt, if he had possessed the requisite knowledge and courage. Inasmuch as he was deficient in the one or the other, or both of these, it becomes philosophers to treat him more charitably in the matter than he treated his cotemporaries.

The Philosophy of Nature requires the extension of charitableness in every direction my thoughts have taken. Men have prayed and worshiped, and feared to leave it off, because they knew no better; have submitted to authorities because they knew no better; have taken the "babes and sucklings" of their race for teachers, because they knew no better; have paid a pack of perfidious pretenders to feed them with intellectual food, prepared by the infants, because they knew no better; and the dealers in the imposture have dealt out degradation and desolation, because they knew no better. The evil is ignorance—the remedy is knowledge.

We do not, of course, hold ourself responsible for articles appearing in *The Dial* which we have not written; and if we take especial notice of any article, it is not because we endorse the rest, but because it has suggested some statements which we think important to the cause of truth. It is not without pleasure that we publish the above, with all its rough disregard of conventionalities, literary and religious; for it shows that our project of an independent magazine finds greeting with the very class of minds which it was designed to reach. Our motto declares that *The Dial* is set to mark only the hours of light: conventionality, timidity, thralldom, are shadowed and sunless hours for it; but wherever there is a hearty, brave, and earnest thought or feeling, there is a ray for it to mark.

The defect of the above article seems to us to be that, in the language of a homely German proverb, it throws out the baby with the bath. Its fierce indignation at superstition holds discrimination in abeyance, and because of the worm cuts down the tree. In the first place, its spirit is impaired by a failure to see how many things, in past and present times, seem to favor the idea of divine interference in behalf of prayer. The Brahmin Gangooly, now in this country, ridiculed, in a conversation we had with him, the idea of bringing cases of healing diseases and casting out devils (lunacies) as evidences of Christ's religion; such things, he said, are frequently done in India to-day. It is not to a philosophical mind improbable that a woman's faith should have been so wrought up that the touching of the hem of Christ's garment should have revolutionized her entire system. In the case, mentioned above, of Mrs. Mattingly, we took some pains, during our residence in Washington, to investigate it, and believe that the facts, though somewhat colored, are substantially as related. Now it implies ages of metaphysical culture, ages of experiment on the connection of the imagination with the nerve-spirit, to resolve such events into the relations of science. In the second place, Nature herself has claims which are somewhat ignored in the article. Let our correspondent read the collection of prayers which we have made

in our Catholic Chapter. These prayers are manifestly earnest; they grew out of a normal stage in the growth of Humanity. Place the savages who have no worship beside Euripides, Socrates, etc., who uttered these prayers, and you see that they are of very poor stature indeed. Now, we are willing to admit the crudeness of the common prayers, the ignorance of seeking to dictate to God what he shall give or forbear. It is plain to us that the words, *Not my will, but Thine, be done*, stultify four-fifths of the pulpit prayers; yet we maintain that these Litanies and Prayers, although a full-grown soul can not live among them any more than the human body could live in the vast fern-growths of early geologic periods, are yet just as natural out-growths of the forming mind, as those ferns were of the forming earth. Then our friend says, let them pass away together—ferns with their swamps, prayers with their superstition—before the higher being! And yet we doubt not that when he was writing his paper it was by the side of a fire fed by those same ferns,—not in the same form, to be sure, but crystallized into coal. Let us crystallize our old creeds, brother, not throw them away! The old superstitions ARE, therefore they mean something; can there be so much smoke and no fire? We admit how poor our attainments are and have been in this direction; but when we see the calf butting at every tree and rock we are pretty sure there are horns behind there which will come out after a while.

Grant that the objections raised by common sense and common instinct are true in regard of Jupiter, Ormuzd, Thor, Allah, Manetho, Brahm, Jehovah, or Trinity, or any other conceivable being, yet the disappearance of these empiricisms do not affect the eternal determination of brain and heart in the direction of Theism. Our impregnable position is, that fin implies water, wing necessitates air, eye light, ear sound; and that the aspiration within which has made every God from a grinning ape to the Father of Jesus, is as definite a reality as fin, wing, eye, or ear, and implies the yet unconceived, unnamed, *but not unfelt* Being who is its proper object.

As for the utterance of the emotions stirred by these influences, it depends entirely for its value on its genuineness, and even then, of course, has no value as altering the will of God. It must be remembered that all Christians, even the orthodox, do not understand Prayer in the gross sense given of it by our friend. Christ has left no petition for a temporal blessing. The Methodist and the Moravian delight to sing:

Prayer is the soul's sincere desire,
Unuttered or expressed,
The motion of a hidden fire
That trembles in the breast.

To oppose the utterance of feelings would be to do away with language altogether. Talking is a ceremony of Thought. There's many a prayer that means the unutterable, but speaks the limited or even narrow word. It is a realm where we will do better to go without plumb-lines and levels. When Mary Stuart was led forth to execution, the Earl of Kent, taunting the crucifix, she held, said: "We should wear Christ in our hearts." "And why," replied the Queen, "should I bear him in my hand if he were not in my heart?" Why should men so strive to utter from their lips what has no essential and inward reality?—Ed.

QUATRAINS.

Cras, heri, hodie.

Shines the last age, the next with hope is seen,
 To-day slinks poorly off unmarked between;
 Future or Past no richer secret folds,
 O friendless Present! than thy bosom holds.

Climacteric.

I am not wiser for my age,
 Nor skilful by my grief;
 Life loiters at the book's first page—
 Ah! could we turn the leaf!

Botanist.

Go thou to thy learned task;
 I stay with the flowers of Spring;
 Do thou of the ages ask
 What me the hours will bring.

Forester.

He took the color of his vest
 From rabbit's coat or grouse's breast,
 For, as the wood-kinds lurk and hide,
 So walks the woodman unespied.

THE CATHOLIC CHAPTER.

WORSHIP.

THE PERSIAN LITANY.

LET us take refuge with Mezdám from dark and evil thoughts
 which molest and afflict us.

O Creator of the essence of supports and stays!

O Thou who showerest down benefits!

O Thou who formest the heart and soul!

O Fashioner of forms and shadows!

O Light of lights!

Thou art the first, for there is no priority prior to Thee!

Thou art the last, for there is no posteriority posterior to Thee!

O worthy to be lauded! deliver us from the bonds of terrestria!
 matter!

Rescue us from the fetters of dark and evil matter!

Intelligence is a drop from among the drops of the ocean of thy place of Souls.

The Soul is a flame from among the flames of the fire of thy residence of Sovereignty.

Mezdam is hid by excess of light. He is Lord of his wishes ; not subject to novelties ; and the great is small, and the tall short, and the broad narrow, and the deep is as a ford to him.

Who causeth the shadow to fall.

The Inflamer, who maketh the blood to boil.

In the circle of thy sphere which is without rent, which neither assumeth a new shape nor putteth off an old one, nor taketh a straight course, Thou art exalted, O Lord ! From Thee is praise, and to Thee is praise.

Thy world of forms, the city of bodies, the place of created things is long, broad and deep. Thou art the accomplisher of desires.

The eyes of Purity saw Thee by the lustre of thy substance.

Dark and astounded is he who hath seen Thee by the efforts of the Intellect.

Mezdam, the First Cause, speaks to the Worshiper.

My light is on thy countenance ; my word is on thy tongue. Me thou seest, me thou hearest, me thou smelllest, me thou tastest, me thou touchest. What thou sayest, that I say ; and thy acts are my acts. And I speak by thy tongue, and thou speakest to me, though mortals imagine that thou speakest to them.

I am never out of thy heart, and I am contained in nothing but in thy heart. And I am nearer unto thee than thou art unto thyself. Thy Soul reacheth me.

In the name of Mezdam, O Siameer ! I will call thee aloft, and make thee my companion ; the lower world is not thy place. Many times daily thou escapest from thy body and comest unto me.

Now, thou art not satisfied with coming unto me from time to time, and longest to abide continually nigh unto me ; I, too, am not satisfied with thy absence. Although thou art with me, and I with thee, still thou desirest and I desire that thou shouldst be still more intimately with me. Therefore will I release thee from thy terrestrial body, and make thee sit in my company.

From the DESATIR, a collection of Persian prophets.

Thou God of all ! infuse light into the souls of men, whereby they may be enabled to know what is the root from whence all their evils spring, and by what means they may avoid them.

Euripides.

O gracious Pan ! and ye other gods who preside over this place ! grant that I may be beautiful within ; and that those external things which I have may be such as may best agree with a right internal disposition of mind ; and that I may account him to be rich who is wise and just.

Socrates.

Wacîe, the Caliph, who died A. D. 845, ended his life with these words : " O Thou, whose kingdom never passes away, pity one whose dignity is so transient."

THE LORD'S PRAYER.

Our Father who art in Heaven, hallowed be Thy name. Thy Kingdom come ; Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven. Give us this day our daily bread ; and forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors. And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil ; for Thine is the kingdom, and the power, and glory, forever.

NOTE.—In the above prayer Jesus gave in a perfect and simplified form prayers already existing, which had grown venerable to the hearts around him. Thus every Jew in his daily morning prayer, says : " Sanctify thy name, O Lord, in thy World." As for the second prayer, the conclusion of every Jewish service is : " We hope in Thee, O Lord, our God, to make thy glorious omnipotence speedily manifest, and to establish thy Heavenly Kingdom " We read in the Talmud, " If any one is on a journey or otherwise pressed for time, let him repeat the following short prayer : ' Our Father which art in Heaven, Thy will be done on high ; Vouchsafe to bestow a peaceful and tranquil mind to those who honor Thee on earth ; but do, O Lord, what seems good in thy sight.' " (Berachoth, p. 29.) The third petition is nearly identical with that in Proverbs xxx. 8. When the proselyte Aquila visited Rabbi Eliezer, he asked him, " Should the entire prospect of a proselyte consist merely in the promise, ' He loveth the stranger to give him bread and raiment.' " (Deut. x. 11) Whereupon the Rabbi answered : " Seems this so very little in thine eyes ? And yet it is what the Patriarch asked of God when he had fled from his father's house, ' Give me only bread to eat and raiment to put on.' " (Bereshith Rabba, Parasha 70.) We have always believed, however, that Jesus meant to spiritualize this prayer—the word *epitrouson* being peculiar and expressive. Dr. Clark thinks more than *bodily* nourishment is meant. The French translate it *le pain substantiel*.—*Forgive us*, etc. The Jew's evening prayer runs : " Lord of the Universe ! I forgive every one who has this day vexed or offended me, or who has injured me, either bodily, or in my honor or property, and may no one be punished by Thee for my sake."—*And lead us not*, etc. In the regular morning prayer of the Jew is this : " Let us, O Lord, not fall into the power of sin, transgression or iniquity, and lead us not into temptation." When the Scroll of the Law is taken out of the Holy Ark, the chant is : " Thine, O Lord, is the greatness, power, glory, and majesty."

CRITICAL NOTICES.

Footfalls on the Boundary of Another World: with Narrative Illustrations. By ROBERT DALE OWEN; formerly Member of Congress, and American Minister to Naples. Philadelphia: Lippincott & Co. 1860. Cincinnati: A. Hutchinson.

This work is superior to any on its subject. Catharine Crowe's *Night-side of Nature*, published just ten years ago, was a fair sample of all works on the inexplicable hitherto written; and its incidents were selected more with reference to romantic interest and exciting effect, than to authenticity and consistency. Mr. Owen is a deeply-stirred inquirer, and possesses a knowledge of philosophical method. The "dear old visionary" will show himself now and then; but there is nothing to cause the work to be looked on as a literary phenomenon. The interest is general, and the subject pertinent to the time.

In this question of the supernatural, the believers and the unbelievers meet much as a tropical wind smiting a southward-bound iceberg. The believer is all aglow; the spirit-world palpitating around him, the loved and lost hovering over life's saddened path: what more could be needed to kindle in the heart an all-devouring flame, which can consume any quantity of logic or criticism which stand in the way? On the other hand, in no region of inquiry beside is the unbeliever so cold. Mention a spirit to him, or a revelation from another world, and he turns to ice on the instant: his speech freezes to criticism, his eye is grey with skepticism, he is a very miser with concessions. This can only be referred to the everlasting distinctions of temperament: the faith is not of ourselves, it is the gift of God; the no-faith is like the legs of the *Sepside*, which only the anatomist's knife can get at—its quantum of bone having gone off into another organ. We have long been of the opinion that men believe *what they've a mind to*. All facts, all Bibles, are sure to combine wonderfully to prove what their prejudice, common sense, or dyspepsia has preconceived. We read not so much to find truths as confirmations and illustrations. Luther did not hesitate to call the epistle of St. James "an epistle of straw," when he found it did not support his views of justification by faith. And the mass of people who shall read this most entertaining book, will find in it, according to their structural capacities, new proofs of Spiritualism, Swedenborgianism, Scriptural Supernaturalism, Diabolism, Catholicism, Mesmerism, Intelligence of Matter and the Odyllic Force, all of which may find strong arguments in it. Certain it is that this realm is yet fluid; many who have cried, Land, ho! have only called our eyes to a fog-bank. Yet we rejoice that truth is an ocean, all roads and highways, one sublime plain, "giving passage to every love, and fair winds to all desirable knowledge."

The Eighteen Christian Centuries. By the REV. JAMES WHITE, Author of a "History of France." From the 23d Edinburgh Edition. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1860. Cincinnati: Rickey, Mallory & Co.

Niebuhr, Carlyle and Grote have so spoilt our generation in the department of history, by introducing that little hump-backed old gentleman (?) who is always asking questions, that it really requires a kind of physical courage to enter the lists in this direction. Mr. Buckle almost proves that there never was a history written. So we opened Mr. White's work with the sophisticated air of Sir Charles Coldstream. "One count we made out very soon against the rash Reverend—he has not yet separated History from Chronology. What has living history to do with centuries? especially, what with dated, labeled centuries? History's centuries begin with 1340, or 1776, not with 1300, 1400, etc., etc. But, then, has not Mr. White gone to the very heart of the word History, *icropus, to view*? He has gone on the principle that there are in

each century great salient, representative events and men : in these the century effloresces. Some one has said, "All history is the record of some half dozen good heads." Mr. White has not generalized so far, but he has seen the high tides, and has sketched with graphic pen epochs and men which are sure to interest. We have no high-flown praise for the work, such as "exhaustive, profound," etc. Mr. White has written a candid and very interesting book.

Self-Help : with Illustrations of Character and Conduct. By SAMUEL SMILES. Author of "The Life of George Stephenson." New York : Harper & Bros. 1860. Cincinnati : Rickey, Mallory & Co.

A very useful work, but not without its perils. Dr. Johnson's rude comparison of self-taught men to the walking dogs, observing that when he saw a dog walk and exclaimed, Admirable ! he meant that it was admirable *for a dog*, is not without its reason : even in the best examples of those who have triumphed over obstacles and become useful self-made men, we have to sigh at the remembrance of how infinitely more they would have been through that culture which the experience of ages has shown to be fit rain and light for mind and character. Yet where there is culture, all examples which inspire self-reliance can not be too highly accredited. Mr. Smiles has, therefore, done a good work in giving this succinct Cyclopedia of such.

Morphy's Games : A Selection of the Best Games Played by the Distinguished Champion in Europe and America. With Analytical and Critical Notes. By J. LOWENTHAL. New York : D. Appleton & Co. Cincinnati : Rickey, Mallory & Co.

The title-page of this work is a sufficient guarantee of its high value to the lovers of this noblest of games. The memoir, etc., are written *con amore* by Lowenthal ; and the external elegance of the book is worthy of its inner beauties. It is an oriental story that one was taken through the pavilions of a great prince, through his fountains, his gardens—all the most brilliant of the East,—then asked if he had ever seen anything more beautiful ? "Yes," he replied, "the chess-play of El-Zuli." We have played over all but one or two of the games in this volume—about 160,—and we know what the word "beautiful" means, as applied to chess-play.

The Right Word in the Right Place, etc. By the Author of "How to Write," etc.. New York : Fowler & Wells, publishers. 1860. Cincinnati : A. Hutchinson, 160 Vine street.

It is surprising how much valuable information there is in this little work. Many grand works on Philology will not give so good a list of synonyms ; and none, that we know, will inform us in a condensed form of the technical terms of trades and professions, of the way to write for the press, read proof, punctuate, etc. It is a sign of the times that such a work should be put out for the people in cheap form. They are reading proof, then !

Misrepresentation : A Novel. By ANNA H. DRURY, author of "Friends and Fortune," "Eastbury," etc. New York : Harper & Bros. 1860. Cincinnati : Rickey, Mallory & Co.

We can say at least, with a good conscience, that this is an entertaining work. A novel that does not bore one need only have the three Demosthenic elements of eloquence—"action, action, action." But a novel that quickens brain and heart must have more ; it must show the grandeur of the simple, the miraculousness of the common-place. It is sad to think how many "thrilling romances" would be knocked in the head if the element of unnatural stupidity were withdrawn from hero or heroine. There is a misunderstanding between

the parties which a word from either would clear up, a word which you and I would have spoken, and ache to interpolate in the book. Assassin ! interpolate that word, speak that most natural thing, and you have made all the rest impossible ! But when one can take the natural word and action and then show healthy and noble results, there is a real novel. We will hope for our graphic authoress an early day when she shall see that fiction is a tedious common-place by the side of fact.

The Professor at the Breakfast-Table: with the Story of Iris. By OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES. Boston : Ticknor & Fields. 1860. Cincinnati : G. S. Blanchard

Good wine needs no bush.

The Lectures of Lola Montes : with a full and complete Biography of her Life, etc. Philadelphia : Peterson & Co. Cincinnati : Rickey, Mallory & Co.

Did Lola Montes write these lectures, or has some one written them for her ? We know of nothing out of Edmund About's *Tolla and Germaine* more piquant, more subtle, more instinct with life. The Lectures on Beautiful Women and the Comic Aspect of Love are worthy of any pen, and *could not* have been written by a bad-hearted person.

Christian Believing and Living: Sermons by F. D. HUNTINGTON, D.D., Preacher to the University, etc. Boston : Crosby, Nichols & Co. Cincinnati : G. S. Blanchard.

Re-Statements of Christian Doctrine, in twenty-five Sermons. By HENRY W. BELLOW. New York : Appleton & Co. Cincinnati : Rickey, Mallory & Co.

The Simplicity of Christ's Teachings : set forth in Sermons. By CHARLES T. BROOKS, Pastor of the Unitarian Church in Newport, R. I.

One need only read these three volumes to appreciate the difficulties which would beset any, even the most experienced voyager who shall start forth to discover the Polar Sea of Liberal Christianity. One can fancy how his adventurous heart would sink within him as he found here a bark frozen in Trinitarian channels, and a little further on a braver one stranded on breakers of ill-disguised Skepticism. One can fancy, too, how such a one would be cheered by finding on some shore, not at the goal, but on the way, a true spirit's-home, where the Simplicity of Christ had spread honest and wholesome fare, and kindled genial and reviving fires. We believe in this great Unitarian movement. We know that the masses feel it as yet to be cold and perilous, but we know that beyond the fields of Ice the warm Sea is beating and fruits and flowers growing. Shall we lament over the first two works named in this notice, ? Or shall we say to young mariner, See what Scylla has done and what Charybdis has done, and whet your eye-beam !

The author of the third of these works, so well known to the lovers of good poetry, whether uttered by the daily beauty of a life or a tongue tuned to lyric song, did not mean to criticise the other two ; but he has done so all the more terribly because unconsciously. *They have abandoned the simplicity which is in Christ.* Mr. Huntington's work shows a fearful lack of moral earnestness, or of any spiritual necessities drawing him to that threadbare costume with its Alexandrian and Bostonian patches. Dr. Bellows' work is the result of a common sense and good-hearted man's effort to be clerical and mystic. Reading it we seem to be listening to the affectations of some French musician, who, having taken a true theme, forgets it in the evolutions of himself, until that over which Beethoven wept in silence and secrecy, is exposed to the *bravos* and noisy uproar of a saloon. Mr. Brooks has done for Unitarianism a Paul's service in writing on its gates the warning of 2 Cor. xi. 3.